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The New International Tax Diplomacy
ITAI GRINBERG*
International tax avoidance by multinational corporations is now front-
page news. At its core, the issue is simple: the tax regimes of different
countries allow multinational corporations to book much of their income
in low-tax or no-tax jurisdictions, and many of their expenses in high-tax
jurisdictions, thereby significantly reducing their tax liabilities. In a time
of public austerity, citizens and legislators around the world have been
more focused on the resulting erosion of the corporate income tax base
than ever before. In response, in 2012, the G-20—the gathering of the
leaders of the world’s twenty largest economies—launched the Base
Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project, the most extensive attempt to
change international tax norms since the 1920s.
In the course of the BEPS project, the field of international tax has
adopted the institutional and procedural architecture for multilateral
action used in international financial law. This Article is the first to ask
whether that architecture will work in the international tax context. To
answer that question, this Article first applies lessons from the interna-
tional financial law literature to assess international tax agreements that
are now being reached through soft-law instruments and procedures
comparable to those that characterize international financial law. This
initial analysis, which draws from the experience in international finan-
cial law, is largely pessimistic. However, this Article then describes how
model tax treaty law—although also a form of soft law—is highly effec-
tive, and differentiates the political economy of international tax law
from that of international financial law. As a result, a key theoretical
point emerges: bifurcating analysis of multilateral efforts to change
international tax norms into their Model Treaty-based and non-Model
Treaty-based components is necessary in order to understand the new
regime for international tax governance. At a more practical level,
bifurcating the analysis highlights that observers should expect the Model
Treaty-based parts of the BEPS project to be implemented, as well as
most parts of the project focused on tax transparency. By contrast,
sustained international coordination in implementing other dimensions of
the project is doubtful. In reaching these conclusions, the Article contrib-
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utes to the broader international economic governance literature by
using a high-profile example from international tax diplomacy to show
how underlying legal institutions affect the prospects for implementation
of international regulatory agreements.
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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, international tax avoidance by multinational corporations
(MNCs) has been front-page news. Senior executives from companies like
Amazon, Apple, Google, and Microsoft were hauled before legislative commit-
tees around the world to face heated inquiries into their international tax
strategies.1 Demonstrators picketed Starbucks to protest aggressive international
tax planning.2 Australian diplomats started calling international tax a “barbecue
stopper,” meaning that Australians stop eating their beloved barbecue to discuss
international tax avoidance.3 Across Europe, Asia, and the United States, press
expose´s and high-profile legislative hearings concentrated public attention on
aggressive international tax planning. In a time of public austerity—a result of
the greatest financial crisis in a generation—citizens around the world are more
focused on the erosion of the corporate income tax base than ever before. In
response to that concern, presidents and prime ministers are now insisting on
change in the international tax regime.
1. See, e.g., Offshore Profit Shifting and the U.S. Tax Code—Part 2 (Apple, Inc.): Hearing Before the
Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, 113th Cong. 35–53 (2013) (statements of Timothy D. Cook, Apple, Inc.; and Peter Oppen-
heimer, Apple, Inc.); Corporate Tax Avoidance, Hearing Before the S. Econ. References Comm.,
Parliament of Austl., Sydney, 8 April 2015, 42–60 (statements of Maile Carnegie, Google Australia;
Tony King, Apple Pty Ltd; and Bill Sample, Microsoft Corp.); Public Accounts Comm., HM Revenue &
Customs: Annual Report and Accounts 2011–2012, 5 Nov. 2012, HC 716 2012–13 (examination of
Troy Alstead, Starbucks; Andrew Cecil, Amazon; and Matt Brittin, Google).
2. UK Uncut Protests over Starbucks ‘Tax Avoidance,’ BBC (Dec. 8, 2012), http://www.bbc.com/news/
uk-20650945 [https://perma.cc/QQR6-6LHQ].
3. Lee A. Sheppard, Barbecue Stoppers and Permanent Establishment, 2015 WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY
113–14 (June 12, 2015).
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With all the pressure for change, the thorny question is: will meaningful
coordination to address international tax avoidance by MNCs be agreed to and
implemented by tax authorities? A moment’s reflection suggests that the chal-
lenges of transnational economic regulation are not unique to international
taxation. This Article argues that we can draw lessons from international finance
because the field of international tax is currently moving in the direction of
adopting an institutional and procedural architecture for multilateral action that
resembles international financial law.
The growing institutional and procedural similarity between international tax
and international financial law is a key consequence of the Base Erosion and
Profit Shifting (BEPS) project—a global effort to address international tax
avoidance launched by the G-20, the annual gathering of the leaders of the
world’s twenty largest economies. The BEPS project is the most extensive
attempt to change international tax norms since the 1920s.4 At its core, the focus
of the project is simple: address features of the tax regimes of different
countries that allow MNCs to shift income to low-tax or no-tax jurisdictions and
expenses to high-tax jurisdictions, thereby eroding the corporate income tax
base of higher tax, often larger market economies.5 The Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which the G-20 has tasked
to undertake the BEPS project, is widely recognized to be “moving full-speed
ahead with an initiative that will drastically change the international tax
landscape.”6
The institutional and procedural similarities that are developing between
international tax law and international financial law as a result of the BEPS
project reflect the heightened public salience of international tax matters as well
as the fact that international tax law, like international financial law—and unlike
international trade law—lacks an international organization with substantial
autonomy and authority. A rich academic literature recounts when international
financial regulatory diplomacy undertaken at the G-20’s direction has been
effective and when it has not. The bulk of that scholarly literature is broadly
pessimistic about the range of issues that can be successfully addressed utilizing
the soft-law forums and procedures that characterize international financial
law.7
4. The BEPS project was launched when the G-20 asked the OECD to create the BEPS Action Plan.
See Communique´, G-20, Los Cabos Summit Leaders’ Declaration, ¶ 48 (Jun. 19, 2012), http://www.g20.
utoronto.ca/2012/2010-0619-loscabos.html [http://perma.cc/J963-ZZ3D] [hereinafter Los Cabos Com-
munique´]; OECD, ACTION PLAN ON BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING 9–11 (2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.
1787/9789264202719-en [https://perma.cc/3UKL-45TX] [hereinafter BEPS ACTION PLAN].
5. Pascal Saint-Amans & Raffaele Russo, OECD: What the BEPS are We Talking About?, 70 TAX
NOTES INT’L 339 (Apr. 22, 2013).
6. Press Release, KPMG, KPMG Survey: Corporate Tax Leaders Skeptical That OECD Will Meet
Goals of “BEPS” Action Plan by Deadline (Oct. 29, 2014), http://www.kpmg.com/us/en/issuesandinsights/
articlespublications/press-releases/pages/kpmg-survey-corporate-tax-leaders-skeptical-that-oecd-will-
meet-goals-of-beps-action-plan-by-deadline.aspx [https://perma.cc/7FUA-GQFQ].
7. For a more detailed discussion, see infra notes 22–23, 25 and accompanying text.
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Unlike most areas of international financial law, the international tax regime
includes a substantial treaty-based component in the form of a network of more
than 3,000 bilateral tax treaties.8 The OECD Model Tax Convention on Income
and Capital (the OECD Model Treaty), although technically soft law, informs
the content of this tax-treaty network in a way that is surprisingly self-
enforcing. Importantly, in practice, when changes are made to the OECD Model
Treaty, to some degree those changes are incorporated into domestic law and
given direct effect by tax administrators and courts, even if the relevant bilateral
tax treaties are not renegotiated. At the same time, the boundary between OECD
Model Treaty-based and other parts of the international tax architecture is
durable.
This Article argues that in assessing the BEPS project and other future
multilateral efforts to change the international tax regime, we should bifurcate
our analysis between OECD Model Treaty-based and other components of
the international tax architecture. Doing so allows us to understand the new
regime for international tax governance at the multilateral level. At a practical
level, this understanding should lead observers to expect the OECD Model
Treaty-based parts of the BEPS project to be implemented, as well as many
parts of the project focused on tax transparency. Everything else is subject to
substantial doubt.
In arriving at these conclusions, this Article makes four contributions that
link the international tax and international political economy literatures. First,
this Article shows how high-salience crises can destabilize even long-
established systems of international governance, substantially changing what
can and cannot be achieved multilaterally. In international tax, the political
pressures brought to bear by the financial crisis swept aside a well-established
and highly technocratic system of governance. The substantial changes wrought
to that system are not well appreciated, but are fundamental. Second, this
Article illustrates that international tax has now adopted many of the procedural
soft-law forms of international financial law including G-20 convocation, stan-
dard-setting, and monitoring. This descriptive claim is new to the literature and
is essential to understanding the new regime for international tax governance at
the multilateral level. Third, this Article draws lessons from the literature
analyzing the evolution of international financial law and applies them to the
enforceability of international tax agreements reached through international
financial law-style forums and procedures. This critical perspective highlights
some challenges the new regime for international tax governance faces. Fourth,
this Article illustrates that tax treaty law differentiates the political economy of
international tax law from that of international financial law in important
8. OECD, OECD/G20 BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT, DEVELOPING A MULTILATERAL
INSTRUMENT TO MODIFY BILATERAL TAX TREATIES 15 (2015), http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/
download/2315401e.pdf?expires!1444664868&id!id&accname!guest&checksum!FB1A7E69039A
BCE6D3C22C6766B3B516 [https://perma.cc/2FBD-6MTE] [hereinafter MULTILATERAL INSTRUMENT].
For a description of the purpose of bilateral tax treaties, see infra notes 195–98 and accompanying text.
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respects. The OECD Model Treaty—an instrument for which there is no
comparable in international financial law—acts as an independent variable that
affects the political economy of international tax affairs.
The picture that emerges is of a new, bifurcated regime for international tax
governance: one that involves two quite different and inconsistently effective
mechanisms for coordinating international tax affairs. In demonstrating how the
new international tax governance regime works, this Article contributes to the
broader literature on international economic law by providing a high-profile
example of how underlying legal institutions can affect the prospect for interna-
tional regulatory agreements to be implemented.
Part I introduces the BEPS project, describes its components, and explains
why the outcomes of the BEPS project should be important to an American
audience. It then introduces international financial law and highlights the similari-
ties between G-20 interventions in international financial law and G-20 interven-
tions in international taxation since 2008. Part II analyzes the import of lessons
drawn from the international financial law literature regarding the potential
efficacy of international economic governance projects for parts of the BEPS
project that are not based on the OECD Model Treaty. Part III describes why
changes to the OECD Model Treaty are unusually self-enforcing for soft law,
such that the lessons of international financial law are not applicable to the
OECD Model Treaty-based portions of the international tax regime.
I. INTERNATIONAL TAX AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL LAW
A. WHAT IS THE BEPS PROJECT AND WHY SHOULD WE CARE ABOUT IT?
The G-20’s endorsement of the BEPS project inaugurated a unique era in
international tax diplomacy. In 2012, the G-20 identified base erosion and profit
shifting by multinational enterprises as a threat to the G-20’s own public fiscs
and requested that the OECD develop a plan to address the newly labeled BEPS
phenomenon.9 The OECD subsequently produced a “BEPS Action Plan” in a
specially created working group incorporating officials from all non-OECD
G-20 countries.10 In 2013, the G-20 endorsed that action plan, simultaneously
mandating that the OECD provide “regular reporting on the development of
proposals and recommendations to tackle the 15 issues identified in the Action
Plan.”11 Over the next two years, international tax officials from across the
OECD and G-20 member countries proceeded to negotiate and write reports
endeavoring to set new standards in a wide range of technical areas of interna-
9. Los Cabos Communique´, supra note 4, ¶ 5.
10. BEPS ACTION PLAN, supra note 4.
11. Communique´, G-20, Meeting of Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors—Moscow, ¶ 18
(Jul. 20, 2013), http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2013/2013-0720-finance.html [https://perma.cc/6Z39-
UT4A].
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tional tax, including in areas that had never been explored before multilaterally.12
The OECD claims that the resulting outputs of the BEPS Action Plan will
reinforce the coherence of corporate income tax law at the international level,
primarily by combating “double non-taxation”; insisting that a deduction on one
side of a cross-border, intra-company transaction should match up with a
taxable inclusion on the other side; realigning taxation and “substance” by
requiring that MNCs recognize income in the jurisdictions where value is
created; and providing improved transparency and a more stable compliance
environment for all stakeholders.13 In contrast, some academic commentators
characterize the fifteen outputs of the BEPS Action Plan as an ad hoc set of
responses to a laundry list of issues that were raised by various sovereigns but
left unaddressed by the OECD over the last twenty years.14 Regardless of
whether one believes there is a coherent intellectual framework for the BEPS
project, most agree that it is the most extensive effort to set multilateral
international tax norms since work was undertaken to create such norms under
the auspices of the League of Nations beginning in the 1920s.
12. In short, the fifteen items in the BEPS Action Plan attempt to achieve the following: 1) establish
new principles to eliminate certain mismatches between income in one jurisdiction and deduction in
another in transactions between related parties, which result in deductions in one country without
corresponding taxation in another, as well as the generation of multiple deductions or multiple foreign
tax credits through a single expense (Action 2); 2) articulate best practices for antideferral rules that
prevent the accrual of income in intermediary jurisdictions that are neither the country of source of a
payment nor the country of residence of the parent of the entity receiving the payment (Action 3); 3)
limit the use of debt to obtain excess interest deductions in high-tax jurisdictions (Action 4); 4) address
“harmful tax practices” by defining when a tax regime that provides a reduced rate for income
generated from intellectual property is not “harmful,” because it includes sufficient protections to
ensure that the tax benefit is provided in the context of substantial activity, rather than mere income-
shifting (Action 5); 5) limit tax treaty abuse and redefine tax nexus requirements (so-called permanent
establishment rules) for the twenty-first century, and negotiate a multilateral instrument to implement
these and other “treaty-based” measures (Actions 6, 7, and 15); 6) change the transfer pricing
guidelines to shift understandings of “arm’s length” pricing within multinational groups away from a
respect for intragroup contracts and intragroup capital allocation and toward a “people functions”
theory of value creation (Actions 8–10); 7) gather data on profit shifting by MNCs in order to quantify
the magnitude of base erosion and profit shifting problems and highlight improvements in a post-BEPS
era (Action 11); 8) establish mandatory disclosure regimes and substantially expanded transfer pricing
reporting requirements to cabin tax planning by MNCs and special tax deals made between an MNC
and a sovereign, by relying on the chilling effect of transparency (Actions 5, 12, and 13); and 9)
improve dispute resolution mechanisms for double taxation disputes (Action 14). BEPS ACTION PLAN,
supra note 4, at 15–24. A report effectively concluded that the “digital economy” is increasingly the
entire global economy and that it is therefore difficult, if not impossible, to “ring-fence” online activity.
OECD, OECD/G20 BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT, ADDRESSING THE TAX CHALLENGES OF THE
DIGITAL ECONOMY 11 (2015), http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/download/2315281e.pdf?expires!1
444665151&id!id&accname!guest&checksum!7ECC06DFE7F99808F286A74388ACF62E [https://
perma.cc/CS2E-KQ6Q]. As a result, concerns raised under “Action 1” of the BEPS Action Plan were
folded into other parts of the BEPS project. Id, at 11–12.
13. BEPS ACTION PLAN, supra note 4, at 13–14.
14. For a summary of the items in the BEPS Action Plan, see supra note 12. See, e.g., Graeme
Cooper, Coordinating Inconsistent Choices—The Problem of Hybrids 1–4 (Sydney Law Sch., Paper
No. 14/108, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id!2538276 [https://perma.cc/5AM
N-Q2F5] (arguing that the BEPS action items lack conceptual coherence).
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Historically, U.S. tax lawyers and academics tended to dismiss multilateral
discussion of international tax rules as a second-order matter. The conventional
wisdom for decades was that the United States would ultimately have a veto
over any outcome at the OECD and would not agree to anything unfavorable to
the United States. Furthermore, the U.S. Congress would not pass laws to
implement any multilateral agreement that was inconsistent with U.S. policy
interests, and until such laws were passed, the content of any multilateral
agreement was irrelevant.
Given this backdrop, one initial question is why academics and practitioners
in the United States should care about the BEPS project or G-20 discussions
about international tax issues in general. An answer is that the United States’
aberrantly high statutory corporate tax rate and atypical system for taxing the
earnings of foreign subsidiaries of U.S.-resident MNCs15 has undermined the
validity of the historic presumption that multilateral discussions would not
constrain U.S. interests. Because the United States has the highest statutory
corporate tax rate in the world, it generally does not make sense for a U.S.-
based MNC to react to changes in foreign law by having a U.S. entity earn
foreign-source income in place of a foreign affiliate.16 Instead, the planning
structures U.S. MNCs must implement to reduce their effective tax rates to
levels similar to those faced by their foreign competitors are highly reliant on
the tax treatment of “foreign-to-foreign” cross-border transactions between
related controlled foreign corporations (CFCs) within U.S. MNCs.17 As a result,
from a U.S. MNC tax-planning perspective, foreign parliaments adopting new
rules regarding the taxation of cross-border income can matter as much as or
more than developments in the U.S. Congress.18
15. See, e.g., PWC, THE TECHNOLOGY CEO COUNCIL, EVOLUTION OF TERRITORIAL TAX SYSTEMS IN THE
OECD 3 (Apr. 2, 2013), www.techceocouncil.org/clientuploads/reports/Report%20on%
20Territorial%20Tax%20Systems_20130402b.pdf [https://perma.cc/L5AY-6U4N].
16. See, e.g., Letter from Jeffrey Bergmann & Barry Slivinsky, Co-Chairs, Silicon Valley Tax Dirs.
Grp., to Sen. Ron Wyden, (then) Chairman, S. Fin. Comm., & Sen. Orrin Hatch, (then) Ranking
Member, S. Fin. Comm. (Aug. 1, 2014), http://svtdg.org/docs/svtdg_letter_to_wyden-hatch_on_tax_
reform.pdf [https://perma.cc/WVQ5-S9D9].
17. Careful planning to take advantage of the deferral benefit allowed by the United States’
international tax rules allows U.S. MNCs to achieve tax burdens on their foreign-source income that are
often similar to those faced by their foreign competitors, despite the fact that foreign statutory corporate
tax rates are well below U.S. statutory corporate tax rates. However, doing so requires substantial
foreign-to-foreign tax planning. See, e.g., Edward D. Kleinbard, Stateless Income, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 699
(2011). Moreover, the background rule that the United States uses to tax multinational enterprises—our
“deferral” system to tax the earnings of foreign subsidiaries of U.S.-resident MNCs—limits the ability
of the United States to participate effectively or lead by example in multinational discussions of
corporate tax policy. The insistence of the United States on pursuing tighter CFC rules in the BEPS
project and the rest of the world’s rejection of that approach provided a vivid example of the limits on
leadership when a country’s baseline rules are inconsistent with global norms. See infra Section II.C;
see also PWC, THE TECHNOLOGY CEO COUNCIL, supra note 15, at E-2 (illustrating that 91% of the
non-U.S. OECD-headquartered companies on the Forbes 500 list of the world’s largest companies for
2012 were headquartered in countries with a dividend exemption system).
18. The International Tax Bipartisan Tax Working Group of the U.S. Senate Finance Committee
observed in June 2015 that “[a]lmost every U.S. multinational company and trade group that met with
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One consequence of the tax-planning environment created by current U.S.
law is that the United States has participated in negotiations in the BEPS project
without its usual bargaining strength. Despite being the world’s largest economy,
in this context, its negotiating power has been significantly eroded. Most
countries understand that U.S. MNCs are reliant on “foreign-to-foreign” tax
planning involving transactions between two or more of their foreign subsidiar-
ies. Thus, foreign sovereigns have more flexibility to change the rules of the
game for U.S.-parented MNCs, without having to deal directly with U.S.
authorities or address their bilateral treaty arrangements with the United States.19
Furthermore, other sovereigns may believe that the United States’ weakened
bargaining position is likely to persist over the near to medium term, given
gridlock on tax reform in Washington. That perception further erodes the United
States’ leverage in international negotiations. At the same time, the history of
G-720 and G-20 initiatives in international economic affairs suggests that once
those bodies engage an issue area within economic law, they tend not to
disengage.21 As a result, diplomatic processes akin to the BEPS process are
likely to be an ongoing feature of international tax affairs going forward.
In this environment, in which U.S. influence over international tax norms has
been reduced relative to historic norms (at least for the time being) and G-20
involvement in international tax affairs is likely to continue, it is important for
the working group has expressed serious concerns about the impact the BEPS Project will have . . . .
[A]nd, in fact, [they] are the intended targets of many of the new rules going into effect.” S. FIN. COMM.,
110TH CONG., INTERNATIONAL TAX BIPARTISAN TAX REFORM WORKING GROUP: FINAL REPORT 8–10 (2015).
19. For instance, all U.S. tax treaties include a “mutual agreement procedure” that provides recourse
to U.S. taxpayers to ask for assistance from the Internal Revenue Service when they believe that the
actions of a treaty country result in or will lead to taxation not intended by the treaty between the two
countries. See Competent Authority Assistance, IRS (May 14, 2015), http://www.irs.gov/Individuals/I
nternational-Taxpayers/Competent-Authority-Assistance [https://perma.cc/22V3-828M]. However, in
the case of transfer pricing adjustments imposed by a foreign sovereign, it is difficult for U.S. MNCs to
invoke so-called “competent authority assistance” from the Internal Revenue Service when the transac-
tion at issue does not involve a U.S. entity. Moreover, finance ministries abroad are aware that U.S.
MNCs generally will not change their tax planning structures to take advantage of the protections
provided by U.S. bilateral tax treaties as a means of defending against increased tax burdens imposed
by source states. The reason is that relying on a U.S. treaty would require subjecting the income in
question to U.S. tax—that is to say, to the highest corporate tax rate in the developed world.
20. The G-7 is a group consisting of the finance ministers and central bank governors of Canada,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Prior to the advent of the
modern G-20 during the financial crisis, the G-7 undertook many of the diplomatic roles now handled
in the G-20.
21. The G-7 and G-20 have made and sustained open-ended commitments to involvement in at least
a dozen areas of international economic law over the last two decades. In contrast, the author’s
investigations suggest only two areas where the G-7/G-20 committed to a subject and subsequently
fully disengaged with the issue: first, the Doha trade round, which the leaders emphasized from
2008–2012, but set aside in 2013 as Doha appeared to collapse; and, second, International Organization
of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) reporting on the functioning of credit default swap markets. See
OICV-IOSCO, THE CREDIT DEFAULT SWAP MARKET REPORT (2012), https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/
pdf/IOSCOPD385.pdf [https://perma.cc/P5HP-W8A7] (concluding IOSCO’s research); Goodbye Doha,
Hello Bali, ECONOMIST (Sept. 8, 2012), http://www.economist.com/node/21562196 [https://perma.cc/
4NWL-92HW].
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U.S. practitioners, policymakers, and academics to develop a better understand-
ing of how multilateral projects like the BEPS initiative work and whether they
can or will be effective. As section I.B. below suggests, understanding the
growing procedural and institutional similarities between international tax and
international financial regulatory coordination provides one helpful starting
point for that analysis.
B. THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL LAW LENS AND THE GROWING INFLUENCE
OF THE G-20
For a quarter century, scholars have worked to explain the political economy
and institutional architecture surrounding the creation and strengthening of
international financial regulatory standards.22 Most international financial law is
established through regulatory agreements that are not usually ratified by legisla-
tors, and are not legally binding on signatories in the traditional sense of
international law.23 Instead, across a wide array of subfields of international
financial regulation, informal intergovernmental organizations that are not consti-
tuted by treaty and are not granted legal agency to act in international affairs
nevertheless drive standard-setting agendas at the international level.24
Although these organizations are constituted by and issue agreements and
declarations with no formal sense of international obligation, they sometimes
successfully function to coordinate regulation of complex cross-border financial
matters internationally.25 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS),
the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), the Finan-
cial Action Task Force (FATF), and the Financial Standards Board (FSB) are
representative examples of what, together, comprises international financial
law.26 For instance, under the G-20’s influence, the BCBS has imposed and
22. Most of these scholars come from international relations or political economy backgrounds. See,
e.g., DANIEL W. DREZNER, ALL POLITICS IS GLOBAL: EXPLAINING INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY REGIMES
(2007); TONY PORTER, GLOBALIZATION AND FINANCE (2005); DAVID ANDREW SINGER, REGULATING CAPITAL:
SETTING STANDARDS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM (2007); ANDREW WALTER, GOVERNING
FINANCE: EAST ASIA’S ADOPTION OF INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS (2008); Ethan B. Kapstein, Resolving the
Regulator’s Dilemma: International Coordination of Banking Regulations, 43 INT’L ORG. 323 (1989);
Thomas Oatley & Robert Nabors, Redistributive Cooperation: Market Failure, Wealth Transfers, and
the Basle Accord, 52 INT’L ORG. 35 (1998). However, key contributions by legal scholars have shown
the way in which law acts as an independent variable in shaping outcomes in financial regulation. See,
e.g., CHRIS BRUMMER, SOFT LAW AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM: RULE MAKING IN THE 21ST CENTURY
(2012); Pierre-Hugues Verdier, The Political Economy of International Financial Regulation, 88 IND.
L.J. 1405 (2013).
23. BRUMMER, supra note 22, at 61; David Andrew Singer, Capital Rules: The Domestic Politics of
International Regulatory Harmonization, 58 INT’L ORG. 531, 535 (2004).
24. Note that while the OECD is a formal organization with legal standing under international law,
the “OECD plus G-20”—the body that is implementing the BEPS project—has no such status.
25. ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 38 (2004).
26. Other soft-law financial standard-setters include the International Accounting Standards Board
and the Committee on Payments and Settlement Systems (known for its Recommendations for Central
Counterparties and Core Principles for Systematically Important Payments Systems). These have
narrower mandates than IOSCO or the BCBS. The FATF also has a narrow mandate but is notable
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refined standards of capital adequacy for internationally active financial institu-
tions; IOSCO has set global standards and best practices for international
securities regulation; and the Financial Action Task Force is known for its
“40!9” guidelines to ensure that financial institutions do not facilitate money
laundering or terrorist financing.27 Each of these bodies devises standards for
subsequent adoption or implementation by national regulators. The Financial
Standards Board has developed standards for macro-prudential regulation while
also coordinating the activities of other international financial regulatory bodies.28
Each of the various standard-setters in specific subareas of international
financial law depends on the G-20. At least since the financial crisis, the G-20
has acted as the primary agenda-setter for their work, defining broad strategic
objectives for international financial regulation. The G-20 not only requests
international coordination around the standards created by the standard-setters it
convenes, but frequently establishes monitoring bodies, enforcement vehicles,
and technical assistance providers (“enablers”) to support compliance with the
new international standard. Thus, a monitoring body may determine whether
national regulators are complying with a standard, potentially imposing disci-
pline. Enforcement mechanisms are often established or threatened by the G-20
and tied to the monitoring bodies’ judgments. Finally, jurisdictions that lack the
human capital needed to meet the standards may be offered technical assis-
tance.29 Taken together, the G-20 and its associated standard-setters, monitoring
bodies, enforcement mechanisms, and enablers create a soft-law meta-
framework for international financial law.30 A key feature of this framework is a
top-down architecture in which G-20 convocation and agenda setting provides
the impetus for law and regulation making.
In contrast to the G-20-centric process for addressing international coordina-
tion in international finance, multilateral dialogue about international tax mat-
ters was historically centered on the Committee on Fiscal Affairs (CFA) at the
OECD, a body whose membership consisted of leading technocrats with author-
ity over international tax affairs in their respective countries.31 Topics for
consideration by the CFA were most often generated by means of prior, often
multiyear discussions in the CFA’s subsidiary bodies, staffed by lower level
because of the efficacy of its peer review mechanism and the enforcement pressures associated with
those peer reviews. See, e.g., Chris Brummer, How International Financial Law Works (and How It
Doesn’t), 99 GEO. L.J. 257, 279–80 (2011).
27. BRUMMER, supra note 22, at 63–69.
28. For further discussion of what can make these institutions effective, see generally the literature
referenced supra note 22.
29. BRUMMER, supra note 22, at 61–114. Before the G-20’s emergence as a major player in 2008, the
G-7 played a similar role.
30. See Brummer, supra note 26, at 257. The diagram below in inspired by BRUMMER, supra note 22,
at 68.
31. Hugh J. Ault, Reflections on the Role of the OECD in Developing International Tax Norms, 34
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 757, 760 (2009). For instance, the representative of the United States at the CFA has
usually been the International Tax Counsel of the United States or the Deputy Assistant Secretary for
International Tax from the Treasury. Id.
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technocrats.32 Given this bottom-up process, multilateral agreement on changes
to international tax norms happened slowly and deliberately, with significant
OECD projects involving even moderate changes to agreed-upon principles
often taking as much as a decade from onset to completion.33
All that began to change in 2009. At their London meeting that year, the
leaders of the G-2034 endorsed a more cooperative international tax environ-
ment as part of their response to the financial crisis.35 For two years, the G-20
limited its efforts to the area of tax administrative cooperation.36 Then, in 2011,
32. Id. at 761.
33. Id. at 762–63. For example, the OECD’s Report on Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establish-
ments was over a decade in the making. Id. at 762.
34. The G-20 describes itself as “the premier forum for [its members’] international economic
cooperation and decision-making.” The G20, AUSTL. GOV’T DEP’T OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS & TRADE,
http://dfat.gov.au/international-relations/international-organisations/g20/pages/the-g20.aspx [https://perma.
cc/3E4B-C8RK] (last visited Feb. 5, 2016).
35. The G-20’s London Declaration explicitly committed to a “new cooperative tax environment,”
and that commitment has been reiterated at each subsequent G-20 meeting. Communique´, G-20,
Declaration on Strengthening the Financial System—London, at 5 (Apr. 2, 2009), http://www.treasury.
gov/resource-center/international/g7-g20/Documents/London%20April%202009%20Fin_Deps_
Fin_Reg_Annex_020409_-_1615_final.pdf [http://perma.cc/6WZZ-A7HJ] [hereinafter London Commu-
nique´].
36. Cross-border administrative cooperation was the one area of international tax matters in which
the G-20—and previously the G-7—had maintained some level of continuing involvement since 1997.
See Communique´, G-8, Confronting Global Economic and Financial Challenges—Denver, ¶ 33 (Jun.
21, 1997), http://www.g8.fr/evian/english/navigation/g8_documents/archives_from_previous _summits/
denver_summit_-_1997/confronting_global_economic_and_financial_challenges.html [http://perma.cc/
JV7Q-F723]; London Communique´, supra note 35, at 4–5; see also Itai Grinberg, The Battle Over
Taxing Offshore Accounts, 60 UCLA L. REV. 304, 313–17 (2012). Eventually the G-20 Finance
Ministers’ interest in transparency and information exchange expanded into a commitment to develop-
ing a global standard on automatic information exchange that would make information on offshore
accounts broadly available to tax administrations around the world. Communique´, G-20, Meeting of
Figure 1: Simplified Architecture of International Financial Law
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the G-20 added a tax component to its economic development agenda.37 Finally,
in 2012, the G-20 expressed an interest in substantive international tax rules
governing the taxation of the cross-border activities of multinational corpora-
tions. As its engagement with international tax grew, G-20 statements about
international tax matters both paralleled the structure and borrowed from the
architecture and tools used in G-20 efforts to shape international financial law.38
Consider the G-20 Leaders’ Declaration on Strengthening the Financial
System in 2009.39 In that document, the G-20 included a section on “Tax
havens” in which they emphasized that they had agreed on a toolbox of
countermeasures for jurisdictions that did not meet international standards for
tax transparency, much as they had done in earlier years when addressing
money laundering and terrorist financing through the financial system.40 Simul-
taneously, the G-20 requested that an existing OECD-affiliated body known as
the Global Forum on Transparency and Administrative Cooperation in Tax
Matters (Global Forum) be transformed into a peer review organization of the
Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors—Washington, ¶ 14 (Apr. 19, 2013), http://www.g20.
utoronto.ca/2013/2013-0419-finance.html [https://perma.cc/P6XZ-PWGY].
37. See Communique´, G-20, Seoul Summit Leaders’ Declaration—Seoul, ¶ 51(h) (Nov. 11–12,
2010), http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/G20COMMUN1110.pdf [https://perma.cc/
DLR9-VF27] [hereinafter Seoul Communique´].
38. Cf. RICHARD ECCLESTON, THE DYNAMICS OF GLOBAL ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE: THE FINANCIAL CRISIS,
THE OECD AND THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL TAX COOPERATION 49 (2012) (discussing how the most
significant consequence of the financial crisis was the transformation of the G-20 into a body that took
on new agendas and functions).
39. London Communique´, supra note 35, at 4–5.
40. Id.
Figure 2: Simplified (Historic) Architecture of International Tax
Multilateralism
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type commonly seen in international financial law.41 The reformed Global
Forum was incorporated into a “peer review trifecta” based on the FATF model,
which also strengthened the peer review mechanisms used by the Financial
Standards Forum (now the FSB).
Thereafter, the G-20 brought the area of administrative cooperation in interna-
tional tax law fully within the rubric of international financial law, addressing it
as part of the international financial law portion of its communique´s and
overseeing the peer-review mechanisms therein as one piece of a broader
financial law peer-review package.42 Thus, at the G-20’s direction,43 the Global
Forum developed a “terms of reference” and created a “methodology” for
conducting peer reviews to determine whether countries were meeting global
standards for tax information exchange upon request.44 In order to successfully
promulgate the new standards for information exchange upon request world-
wide, the Global Forum searched for enablers that would help implement the
standard.45 These tools were all imported from international financial law, and
over four years an international financial law-style meta-architecture, involving
a standard-setter, a monitoring mechanism, enablers, and enforcement threats,
was established for information exchange in cross-border tax administrative
cooperation.46 Since a key part of the effort was ensuring that tax-relevant
information could be obtained from financial institutions, this first step towards
applying the international financial law model to international tax affairs was
41. See id. at 4–6.
42. For extended discussions of these developments, see ECCLESTON, supra note 38, at 86–99 and
Grinberg, supra note 36, at 313–17.
43. See London Communique´, supra note 35, at 4.
44. GLOB. FORUM ON TRANSPARENCY & EXCH. OF INFO. FOR TAX PURPOSES, OECD, REVISED METHODOL-
OGY FOR PEER REVIEWS AND NON-MEMBER REVIEWS 1–2 (2011), http://www.oecd.org/ctp/44824721.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AQN5-2KAK] (detailing how to conduct reviews); GLOB. FORUM ON TRANSPARENCY &
EXCH. OF INFO. FOR TAX PURPOSES, OECD, TERMS OF REFERENCE: TO MONITOR AND REVIEW PROGRESS
TOWARDS TRANSPARENCY AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION FOR TAX PURPOSES (2010), http://www.oecd.org/tax/
transparency/about-the-global-forum/publications/terms-of-reference.pdf [https://perma.cc/J494-
MZVQ] (describing in detail international standards for information exchange upon request in tax
matters).
45. The OECD lacked sufficient capacity or experience engaging in technical assistance to less
developed countries, so the Global Forum leadership sought additional assistance from multilateral
organizations focused on development, and in particular focused on the tax team at the World Bank.
They did so to fulfill another G-20 mandate: to treat tax information exchange as a mechanism by
which to help build sustainable revenue bases for inclusive growth and social equity by improving
developing country tax administration systems. Seoul Communique´, supra note 37, ¶ 51(h).
46. See generally Itai Grinberg, Taxing Capital Income in Emerging Countries: Will FATCA Open
the Door?, 5 WORLD TAX J. 325, 325–67 (2013) (highlighting the potential benefits for emerging
countries’ tax administrations of a uniform automatic information exchange regime for taxing income
from capital). Shortly thereafter the Global Forum began to import the peer review architecture into the
area of automatic information exchange, as opposed to information exchange upon request, as part of a
broader effort to enforce the OECD’s Common Reporting Standard. The Common Reporting System
builds on U.S. automatic information exchange efforts developed under the auspices of legislation
known as the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA).
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intuitive and natural. The primary issue G-20 leaders were concerned about was
tax evasion facilitated by the use of offshore accounts at financial institutions.
In 2012, the G-20 broadened its interest in international tax affairs to
encompass the taxation of MNCs when, in the midst of politically unpopular
austerity, it identified BEPS as a threat to the G-20’s own public fiscs.47 As with
offshore tax evasion, the rhetoric and form of the G-20’s efforts to expand its
involvement in international tax matters to encompass substantive rules for
taxing the cross-border activities of multinational enterprises shared the trap-
pings of its forays into international financial regulation.48 Rhetorically, the
G-20 justified its expanded interest in substantive international tax rules as
necessary to ensure the perception of fairness vis-a`-vis the fiscal burden borne
by citizens in an era of public austerity. Meanwhile, in form, the “action items”
endorsed by the G-20 consisted almost exclusively of soft-law measures.49 In
other words, as is the case in the G-20’s international financial regulatory
agenda, the BEPS Action Plan anticipated countries agreeing on recommenda-
tions and instruments that lack formal legal obligation. Moreover, the G-20
regularly addressed the BEPS issue in the part of its communique´ devoted to
international finance, just as it had offshore tax evasion (even though the focus
of the BEPS project is not primarily on the financial sector). Taken together,
these features suggest that at the G-20 deputies’ level, international tax came to
be thought of as analogous to “international financial law,” even outside the area
of offshore tax evasion—the one area of international taxation that is focused on
compliance by financial institutions.50
In 2015, as the first phase of the BEPS project concluded, both the OECD
and governments spoke of using the mechanisms of international financial law
to further develop BEPS outputs and to monitor compliance with BEPS out-
comes. The 2015 BEPS Explanatory Statement—the political overview for the
outcomes of the entire BEPS project—emphasized:
47. The G-20 addressed the BEPS issue as part of its declaration about “reforming the financial
sector and fostering financial inclusion.” Los Cabos Communique´, supra note 4, at 4–5.
48. Indeed, the 2012 communique´ that launched the BEPS project described it as part of the G-20’s
efforts in “reforming the financial sector and fostering financial inclusion.” Los Cabos Communique´,
supra note 4, at 4–5. Separately, it is worth noting that at about the time the BEPS project was
launched, Pascal Saint-Amans, the leading official of the Global Forum, became the leader of the
OECD’s Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, where he brought the experience and some of the
international financial law-style practices that were utilized at the Global Forum into his new role.
Pascal Saint-Amans - Director, Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/
ctp/pascal-saint-amans.htm [https://perma.cc/4UW9-ECZ5] (last visited Feb. 4, 2016).
49. Indeed, only the proposal for a multilateral instrument for tax matters crosses the threshold into a
binding formal commitment made by sovereigns, and unlike any other part of the BEPS Action Plan,
this measure is expressly reserved for “interested parties”: in other words, it is limited to a coalition of
the willing. BEPS ACTION PLAN, supra note 4, at 24.
50. At the same time, G-20 communique´s have begun to recognize the distinctions between
international taxation writ large and financial sector regulation. Notably, when refining the charter for
the FSB, which acts as an overarching coordinator for G-20 efforts in international financial regulation,
the G-20 did not include the OECD’s CFA as one of the standard-setting bodies that engages with the
FSB. See London Communique, supra note 35, at 1.
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[I]t appears necessary to further deepen cooperation and focus on monitoring
the implementation and effectiveness of the measures adopted in the context
of the BEPS Project . . . . [M]onitoring will consist of an assessment of
compliance in particular with the minimum standards in the form of reports
on what countries have done to implement the BEPS recommendations. It will
involve some form of peer review which will have to be defined and adapted
to the different Actions . . . .51
At the OECD, detailed discussions are already underway about establishing
these institutional mechanisms, which are akin to those found in international
financial law.52 Standard-setting bodies, to create terms of reference, have been
appointed for specific technical issues like dispute resolution, and peer review
mechanisms are being developed to determine whether minimum BEPS stan-
dards are being met.53 These mechanisms were not often used in international
tax before the G-20 became involved. Whether these mechanisms for governing
international tax affairs will be effective in areas of international tax affecting
MNCs, including in areas outside the financial sector, remains to be seen.
Nevertheless, the procedural architecture itself is well on the way to being
deeply entrenched.
One lesson of potentially general application that emerges from this story of
procedural regime change in international tax is that high-salience crises can
alter even long-established processes of multilateral decision making in techno-
cratic areas of international economic law. Appreciating those changes can help
analysts focus on the right actors and decision-making levers when evaluating
international developments in a given area of international economic governance.
II. OUTSIDE THE OECD MODEL TREATY: LESSONS FROM INTERNATIONAL
FINANCIAL LAW
Scholars have worked for many years to explain the political economy and
institutional architecture surrounding the creation and strengthening of interna-
tional financial standards and regulation in the absence of a formal international
law forum for multijurisdictional coordination. Their analysis focuses largely on
the interests and exercise of power by leading states; the interplay between
regulators, industry groups, and elected policymakers at the domestic level; and
the impact of transgovernmental networks of regulators as well as nonstate
actors.54 Within that context, legal scholars describe the ways that soft interna-
tional financial law informs the behavior of a host of regulatory and financial
51. See OECD/G20 BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT, EXPLANATORY STATEMENT 10 (2015),
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps-explanatory-statement-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/X422-ZN22].
52. See, e.g., id. at 10–11.
53. See id.
54. Eric Helleiner & Stefano Pagliari, The End of an Era in International Financial Regulation?, 65
INT’L ORG. 169, 169–200 (2011).
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actors.55
In this Part, I argue that certain broad lessons from the international financial
regulatory literature may be applicable to analysis of the BEPS project and
future multilateral efforts in international tax law. In doing so, I do not suggest
that international finance necessarily provides the closest natural analog to
international tax within the various fields of international economic governance.
Rather, the point is that the decision by the G-20 to adopt the soft-law
architecture of international financial law to address international tax itself is
consequential—even if it was taken without much reflection—and that as a
result studying the outcomes of prior projects that used that same soft-law
architecture can provide a useful perspective on the new environment for
international tax multilateralism. 56
However, before proceeding to the lessons, a brief consideration of the
substantive limits to the analogy between international financial law and interna-
tional tax law is required. First, the balance of power among stakeholders and
the perceived sources of influence are not identical.57 Second, analysis by
analogy to past events in other policy areas cannot account for the particular
predispositions of individual decision makers, whose choices are often a key
variable in international diplomatic processes.58 Third, some issues within
international financial law—systemic financial risk, for example—may provide
stronger incentives for international coordination than exist in international
tax.59 Fourth, a smaller number of central players may be involved in interna-
55. BRUMMER, supra note 22.
56. Cf. Philipp Genschel & Thomas Rixen, Settling and Unsettling the Transnational Legal Order of
International Taxation, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS 154 (Gregory Shaffer & Terrance Halliday
eds., 2015). The lessons garnered from international financial law are particularly helpful in part
because the way international tax diplomacy works is so deeply understudied. See Diane Ring,
International Tax Relations: Theory and Implications, 60 TAX L. REV. 83, 83–85 (2007). One notewor-
thy exception to that general point comes from the literature on the OECD’s (largely unsuccessful)
Harmful Tax Competition project from the late 1990s. That project is distinguishable from BEPS for
three important reasons. First, the BEPS project does not seek to develop different standards for OECD
and non-OECD countries and therefore does not explicitly create a group of insiders and outsiders.
Second, BEPS focuses primarily on constraining private sector rather than government behavior. Third,
BEPS is much more politically salient than the HTCP was, and therefore much more heavily driven by
G-20 processes, rather than OECD processes. In each of these respects BEPS is more like international
financial law than HTCP, and therefore I do not focus on the literature regarding the HTCP in this
paper. Cf. Thomas Rixen, From Double Tax Avoidance to Tax Competition: Explaining the Institutional
Trajectory of International Tax Governance, 18 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 197, 215–16 (2011) (arguing that
the Harmful Tax Competition project constituted an attempt at layering an additional component into
the international tax regime, while acknowledging that work had meager results).
57. As described in Part I, U.S. influence in international tax affairs is, at least at present, weaker
than it is in international financial law. See supra pp. 1144–46.
58. Cf. HONEY AND VINEGAR: INCENTIVES, SANCTIONS, AND FOREIGN POLICY (Richard N. Haass &
Meghan L. O’Sullivan eds., 2000).
59. Cf. Federico Lupo-Pasini & Ross P. Buckley, Global Systemic Risk and International Regula-
tory Coordination: Squaring Sovereignty and Financial Stability, 30 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 665, 669
(2015) (“After the financial crisis, systemic risk reduction was at the top of the international regulatory
agenda. This is unsurprising given the high level of financial integration of the last twenty years.”).
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tional financial law, because financial institutions around the world are often
reliant on just two major financial centers (London and New York) in order to
be able to do business cross-border, to a larger degree than is the case in
cross-border trade and investment more generally.60
Most importantly, distributional considerations are central to many, although
not all, issues in international taxation. Different proposed solutions to interna-
tional tax issues can encourage different allocation of revenue, business activity,
or both as among states. Competitive dynamics are often at play, as evidenced
by global phenomena like the decline in corporate tax rates around the world
and the proliferation of so-called patent boxes, which provide a preferential rate
of tax for income related to intellectual property.61 As a result, national interests
in international tax can diverge sharply. At the most basic level, consider that
when a multinational corporation shifts profits from a high tax jurisdiction to a
low tax one so as to reduce total tax payments, collective revenue of all
countries affected must fall, but revenue in the low tax country can only
increase.62 Now imagine if shifting revenue also requires shifting activity; be
that labor generally or particularly attractive research and development or
headquarters activity. In this case, the distributional consequences of interna-
tional tax can affect both government revenue and national employment. The
distributive consequences of proposed changes to domestic law or international
norms can often be mapped onto divides between lower tax and higher tax
states, smaller, largely open economies’ and larger, less open economies, and
more.63
Regulating the financial sector presents some of these same challenges. The
bulk of the international financial regulatory literature views many issues in
60. Beth Simmons, The International Politics of Harmonization: The Case of Capital Market
Regulation, in DYNAMICS OF REGULATORY CHANGE: HOW GLOBALIZATION AFFECTS NATIONAL REGULATORY
POLICIES 4–5 (David Vogel & Robert A. Kagan eds., 2004). Although finance was historically bipolar, it
is becoming more multipolar, and in that sense more like tax. However, there is also a longer tradition
in both the United States and the United Kingdom of threatening to withhold market access in
international finance in order to secure international cooperation than is the case outside finance.
Moreover, international trade rules impose fewer constraints in this regard than in other product or
services markets. Finally, outside finance the two largest players with a sufficient degree of regulatory
capacity to lead are the United States and the European Union, rather than the United States and the
United Kingdom. However, because of the rule of unanimity for tax decision making in the EU as well
as the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice, the EU is deeply constrained in what it can do
unilaterally in international tax matters. Meanwhile the United States is unable to provide leadership for
the reasons described earlier, see supra notes 15–19 and accompanying text.
61. See Michael J. Graetz, Can a 20th Century Business Income Tax Regime Serve a 21st Century
Economy?, 30 AUSTL. TAX F. 551 (2015) (pointing out the myriad dimensions on which tax rules may
affect business decisions and therefore the various reasons nations may choose to compete).
62. See, e.g., IMF, SPILLOVERS IN INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE TAXATION 14 (2014), https://www.imf.org/
external/np/pp/eng/2014/050914.pdf [https://perma.cc/PG5H-29GH].
63. For instance, small countries can be winners in tax competition games—because they have
relatively little to lose from reducing taxation of their small domestic bases, but much to gain from
attracting large bases from abroad. See, e.g., Michael Keen & Kai A. Konrad, The Theory of
International Tax Competition and Coordination, in 5 HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 257, 273–74
(Alan J. Auerbach et al. eds., 2013).
1154 [Vol. 104:1137THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
international financial law as quite deeply distributional as between states.
Moreover, like multinational corporate activity more generally, international
finance is by nature highly mobile (indeed, in some respects, more mobile).
Rules targeting mobile capital, whether they involve tax or finance, are inher-
ently more difficult and inherently more likely to lead to competitive responses
among states than rules targeting product markets directly, because, unlike
capital, consumers rarely move to another jurisdiction in response to strict
regulatory standards.64 Nevertheless, taxation is simply more explicitly distribu-
tional than financial regulation. Tax revenue represents the “lifeblood of a
country’s government.”65 Thus, countries tend to view autonomy in tax policy
as a core attribute of their authority and may protect “tax sovereignty” more
forcefully than sovereignty in international financial regulatory matters.
While the distinctions between international financial governance and interna-
tional tax governance prove relevant to the analysis, the core claim of this
section is that lessons drawn from the diplomatic dynamics of international
financial governance provide a useful perspective on international tax matters
going forward, precisely because the G-20 has chosen to engage international
tax with the same tools and governance architecture it uses in international
financial law. Five lessons stand out. First, as the political salience of an issue
increases,66 the importance of traditional understandings among transnational
regulatory communities declines. Rational calculations about domestically deter-
mined national interests (logics of consequences) increasingly trump technocrati-
cally constructed understandings of global policy coherence (logics of
appropriateness) as decision making moves from a technocratic to a political
level.67 Second, in this environment, whether soft international economic law is
effective depends more heavily on whether preferences are aligned and distribu-
tive problems are largely absent among the major economies than is the case
when an issue is left to technocrats.68 Third, even when incentives are not
aligned between major state actors, “agreements” tend to occur in more politi-
cized settings when the political pressures demand it. However, for such
agreements to be implemented, there must be either the exercise of coercion by
a sufficiently powerful subset of leading economies or market dynamics that
allow a subset of states to set regulatory standards globally without affirma-
64. Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 17 (2012).
65. Grinberg, supra note 36, at 354 (internal citation omitted).
66. See infra note 74 for a definition of political salience as used herein.
67. See STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 51 (1999) (arguing that in the
international system, when decisions are made by actors subject to or cognizant of domestic political
pressures, logics of consequences, meaning rational calculations designed to maximize a given set of
unexplained national preferences, tend to trump logics of appropriateness, meaning, for example,
regulator–community understandings about policy coherence and consequent “appropriate” courses of
action for sovereigns).
68. For example, regulatory agreements intended to force public disclosure of information can create
non-excludable benefits that are also largely non-rival among G-20 countries, thereby approaching a
global public good, which facilitates agreement.
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tively coercing other states.69 Fourth, when nation-states do not identify distribu-
tive problems at the outset, path dependence may also be important. Finally, the
ultimate efficacy of agreements often depends on the ease of evaluating compli-
ance and the extent to which enforcement mechanisms work. Mock compliance
is an option, including for smaller economies, in various circumstances. The
remainder of this Part fleshes out the import of these lessons in the international
tax context. Importantly, as explained in Part III, in international tax, these
lessons are mostly applicable to multilateral efforts undertaken outside the
scope of the OECD Model Treaty.
A. POLITICAL SALIENCE CAN SIMULTANEOUSLY BROADEN THE AGENDA AND LOWER THE
EFFICACY OF TRANSNATIONAL REGULATORY NETWORKS
Before the financial crisis, there was relatively little public awareness of
either international tax law or international financial law.70 The idea that leading
politicians would attempt to comprehensively address the multilateral dimen-
sion of international tax affairs in response to public pressure was so remote that
the literature never seriously considered the question.71 Similarly, until recently,
most literature on international financial law assumed that the complexity of
these matters would ensure that politicians remained largely uninvolved. As a
result, subject-matter specialists in government and industry were thought to
address issues in a relative vacuum.72 In this context, the practices and expecta-
tions of the community of regulators from other nation-states, as well as
private-sector advisors, could be powerful motivators in reaching agreement
69. Cf. Bradford, supra note 64, at 17–18 (describing circumstances where the EU can set regulatory
standards globally without engaging in any overt coercion of other states).
70. BRUMMER, supra note 22, at 98; see also Stefano Pagliari, Public Salience and International
Financial Regulation, Explaining the International Regulation of OTC Derivatives, Rating Agencies,
and Hedge Funds (2013) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Waterloo), https://uwspace.
uwaterloo.ca/bitstream/handle/10012/7344/Pagliari_Stefano.pdf?sequence!1&isAllowed!y. Simi-
larly, the claim by the OECD that international tax issues are at a high point of political prominence is
in part an acknowledgement that they had no political prominence before 2008. See Angel Gurrı´a,
Secretary-General, OECD, Remarks delivered at Joint Press Conference on the G-20 Tax Agenda (Sept.
20, 2014), http://www.oecd.org/g20/topics/taxation/g20-tax-agenda-press-conference.htm [https://perma.
cc/NN7P-KJ3M] (“International tax evasion and avoidance has been a headline issue for more than 5
years.”).
71. See Hugh J. Ault, Wolfgang Schoen & Stephen E. Shay, Base Erosion and Profit Shifting: A
Roadmap for Reform, 68 BULL. FOR INT’L TAX’N 275, 276 (2014).
72. Pagliari, supra note 70, at 8–9. This assumption of constructivist analysis echoes Anne-Marie
Slaughter’s broader argument that transgovernmental regulatory networks foster more extensive and
more effective international cooperation by “disaggregate[ing] states.” SLAUGHTER, supra note 25, at 12.
For another celebratory account of transnational regulatory networks, see work by Kal Raustiala, who
argues that the disaggregation of the state through direct international cooperation among national
regulatory agencies was a logical response to changes in the regulatory environment brought about by
technological innovation, the expansion of domestic regulation, and economic globalization. Kal
Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the Future
of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 1 (2002); see also Helleiner & Pagliari, supra note 54, at 174.
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among the relevant technocrats.73
Recent analysis suggests that this constructivist approach to understanding
cross-border regulatory cooperation—which focuses on notions of policy coher-
ence and fairness developed among national regulators participating together in
a transnational regulatory community (logics of appropriateness)—is less help-
ful in understanding international economic regulatory developments as the
salience of an issue increases.74 For instance, since the financial crisis, most
observers agree that domestic political pressures have been instrumental in
shaping international financial law.75
Indeed, numerous scholars cite politicization and domestic pressures as an
important reason that the regulatory agenda of international financial law has
broadened in the last five years.76 Thus, when international financial law
became more politicized after the financial crisis, the G-20 pushed regulators to
revisit global capital standards (Basel III),77 identify and heighten prudential
standards for global systemically important banks and insurers, develop cross-
border resolution mechanisms to attempt to limit taxpayer losses, and expand
international regulatory discussions of risks emanating from hedge funds, over-
the-counter derivatives, and other features of the shadow-banking system.
Technical specialists had identified all of these issues before the financial crisis,
but political will was required for them to become part of regular discussions
among cross-border regulators.
Similarly, the OECD’s BEPS project has substantially broadened the interna-
tional tax agenda. The G-20 has put several items on the multilateral tax agenda
73. See PORTER, supra note 22; WALTER, supra note 22; Marc Quintyn & Michael W. Taylor, Should
Financial Sector Regulators Be Independent?, 32 IMF ECON. ISSUES 1 (2004); see also BRUMMER, supra
note 22; ERIC HELLEINER, THE STATUS QUO CRISIS: GLOBAL FINANCIAL GOVERNANCE AFTER THE 2008
MELTDOWN 5, 84 (2014) (discussing how despite bold initiatives posited by the G-20 in the immediate
wake of the crisis, transformative change failed to occur).
74. Helleiner & Pagliari, supra note 54, at 174. Salience, in the sense I intend to use the word,
depends on the extent to which an event raises public awareness of a given regulatory domain in the
countries that dominate the international regulatory policymaking in the relevant area. Note that
salience is not directly related to the severity of the crisis, the role that the specific sector has in
originating that crisis, or the likelihood that a given regulatory framework will address the issues over
which there is heightened public awareness. In other words, perception and reality may diverge.
75. See, e.g., Eric Helleiner & Stefano Pagliari, Between the Storms: Patterns in Global Financial
Governance, 2001–2007, in GLOBAL FINANCIAL INTEGRATION THIRTY YEARS ON: FROM REFORM TO CRISIS
42 (Geoffrey R. D. Underhill, Jasper Blom & Daniel Mu¨gge eds., 2010).
76. See id.; see also, Eleni Tsingou, Regulatory Reactions to the Global Credit Crisis: Analysing a
Policy Community Under Stress, in GLOBAL FINANCE IN CRISIS: THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL REGULA-
TORY CHANGE 21 (Eric Helleiner, Stefano Pagliari & Hubert Zimmermann eds., 2010) (stating that
financial policy has “ostensibly been politicized” when discussing how the key features of pre-crisis
governance have been affected); Helleiner & Pagliari, supra note 54, at 189 (discussing that scholars
need to be prepared to focus on a wider set of international regulatory outcomes given recent trends,
including the influence of domestic politics).
77. The Basel Accords (Basel I, Basel II, and Basel III) set out international standards for how much
capital banks need to hold to safeguard their solvency against the financial and operational risks they
face. See Verdier, supra note 22, at 1466–67; Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Transnational Regulatory Net-
works and Their Limits, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 113, 132 (2009) [hereinafter Verdier II].
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including agreed-upon principles on addressing hybrid instruments,78 best prac-
tices for controlled foreign corporation rules,79 recommendations for limitations
on interest expense deductibility,80 and mandatory disclosure regimes intended
to cabin both MNC tax planning and special tax deals made between an MNC and a
sovereign.81 Again, specialists had identified most of these items before the G-20
entered the fray, but they required political backing to be elevated to a level where
serious dialogue would take place among international tax technocrats.
However, even as high public interest has broadened the international regula-
tory agenda in both international finance and international tax law, it has also
driven more political responses to perceived problems. Public attention pres-
sured technocrats to adopt policies their respective publics were believed to
favor, in part because heightened political salience substantially increased the
likelihood that elected officials (and high-level political appointees) would
become directly involved in negotiations, rather than delegating most authority
to technocrats.82
In international financial law, higher public salience increased the propensity
for broad agreements of principle among the strongest states. However, those
78. See OECD, OECD/G20 BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT, NEUTRALISING THE EFFECTS OF
HYBRID MISMATCH ARRANGEMENTS (2015), http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/neutralising-the-effects-
of-hybrid-mismatch-arrangements-action-2-2015-final-report_9789264241138-en [https://perma.cc/
T7K7-VRG5] [hereinafter BEPS ACTION 2].
79. See OECD, OECD/G20 BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT, DESIGNING EFFECTIVE
CONTROLLED FOREIGN COMPANY RULES (2015), http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/designing-effective-
controlled-foreign-company-rules-action-3-2015-final-report_9789264241152-en [https://perma.cc/JJ9F-
BFEN] [hereinafter BEPS ACTION 3].
80. See OECD, OECD/G20 BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT, LIMITING BASE EROSION
INVOLVING INTEREST DEDUCTIONS AND OTHER FINANCIAL PAYMENTS (2015), http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/
taxation/limiting-base-erosion-involving-interest-deductions-and-other-financial-payments-action-4-
2015-final-report_9789264241176-en [https://perma.cc/T5YX-CGJV] [hereinafter BEPS ACTION 4].
81. See OECD, OECD/G20 BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT, MANDATORY DISCLOSURE
RULES (2015), http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/download/2315371e.pdf?expires!1453998139
&id!id&accname!guest&checksum!E7CB323873EC3AC448A1ACDCD1ADAAF2 [https://perma.
cc/TC73-ARPV] [hereinafter BEPS ACTION 12]; OECD, OECD/G20 BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING
PROJECT, COUNTERING HARMFUL TAX PRACTICES MORE EFFECTIVELY, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT TRANSPARENCY
AND SUBSTANCE (2015), http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/countering-harmful-tax-practices-more-
effectively-taking-into-account-transparency-and-substance-action-5-2015-final-report_9789264241190-
en [https://perma.cc/GK6Z-KVKJ] [hereinafter BEPS ACTION 5] (discussing mandatory disclosure of
private rulings).
82. Helleiner & Pagliari, supra note 75, at 194. The leading international tax officials from countries
like Australia, China, and the United Kingdom now routinely comment at public conferences about the
importance of public sentiment in shaping their policy positions. Academics have differed on the
mechanism of action by which high public salience may affect policymaking in the international
financial regulatory space. In David Singer’s telling, crises may create bureaucratic incentives for
regulators to take action in order to appease their political masters. SINGER, supra note 22, at 30. Oatley
and Nabors argue that elected politicians rather than regulators are more likely to play a direct role in
shaping the content of national and international regulatory policies after crises. Thomas Oatley &
Robert Nabors, Redistributive Cooperation: Market Failure, Wealth Transfers, and the Basle Accord,
52 INT’L ORG. 35, 42 (1998); see also Pagliari, supra note 70, at 9 (contending that when an issue is
salient, politicians may intervene to reshape what would otherwise be the activities of a transnational
regulatory network); Verdier II, supra note 77, at 127 (similar).
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agreements around high principles often left key issues unresolved.83 Then, as
the distributive consequences associated with addressing these issues became
clear, the G-20 process and related technocratic work revealed a substantial
propensity to elide key issues. To provide just one example, the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) has observed that “[c]onsensus has been reached on a
framework” for addressing cross-border bank resolution, but “important details
need to be worked out—as yet, orderly resolution of systemic cross-border
banks is not a feasible option.”84
In international tax, as the salience of the issues increased, preexisting norms
of discourse developed by the community of international tax regulators were
often wiped out.85 Logics of appropriateness developed among regulators over
time gave way to political and economic pressures internal to states in determin-
ing most regulators’ behavior, both on the international diplomatic stage and in
connection with unilateral regulatory decisions made without regard to any
international consensus.86 To date, the consequences are seen most clearly in the
area of substantive transfer-pricing guidance.
Transfer-pricing regimes provide the conceptual framework for pricing inter-
company transactions, which function to allocate income between the various
tax jurisdictions in which an MNC operates. The “arm’s length” principle of
international tax enforcement is designed to prevent MNCs from using transfer
pricing to create tax advantages for themselves because they operate in group
form rather than conducting business as independent enterprises transacting
with one another across borders, and as a result can dictate the pricing of
inter-firm cross-border transactions.87
For more than thirty years, the arm’s length principle represented a consen-
sual solution to the problem of allocating tax between different parts of an
MNC.88 Although the mantra of arm’s length masked real disagreement, and
83. HELLEINER, supra note 73, at 17.
84. IMF, CROSS-BORDER BANK RESOLUTION: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 4 (2014).
85. See, e.g., Robert B. Stack, Deputy Assistant for Int’l Tax Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury,
Remarks at the OECD-USCIB Conference (June 11, 2015) (bemoaning that “countries are going their
own way,” and emphasizing that he wanted everyone to ask the question “do we have a set of shared
rules, or don’t we?”) (on file with author); see also Robert B. Stack, U.S. Treasury Official Discusses
the Progress and Future of the OECD BEPS Project, 78 TAX NOTES INT’L 1193, 1196 (2015).
86. The United Kingdom’s policy positions taken in connection with the BEPS project, in terms of
publicly expressed support by politicians for multilateral action in the face of domestic political
pressure, and unilateral implementation of their Diverted Profits Tax despite the clear deviation from
global norms, make the United Kingdom an exemplar of this model of action.
87. See, e.g., OECD, OECD/G20 BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT, ALIGNING TRANSFER
PRICING OUTCOMES WITH VALUE CREATION 9 (2015), http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/aligning-transfer-
pricing-outcomes-with-value-creation-actions-8-10-2015-final-reports_9789264241244-en [https://perma.
cc/25E8-UCKY] [hereinafter BEPS ACTIONS 8–10]. The arm’s length principle requires that transactions
between associated enterprises be priced as if the enterprises were independent, such that the pricing
reflects what third parties operating at arm’s length would agree with one another.
88. John Neighbour, Transfer Pricing, Keeping it at Arm’s Length, OECD OBSERVER (Jan. 2002),
http://www.oecdobserver.org/news/archivestory.php/aid/670/Transfer_pricing:_Keeping_it_at_arms_
length.html [https://perma.cc/3WQW-D83U]. Of course, important academic critiques and alternative
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members of the transfer pricing practitioner community often held the view that
there was substantial controversy as to the proper implementation of the arm’s
length standard, the range of interpretation was, in practice, reasonably narrow.
Major transfer-pricing disputes arose with regularity,89 but they were addressed
within a framework that largely respected intercompany contracts and the
concept of allocation of risk within a multinational group.90 Whether one views
that outcome as good policy or not, the relatively clear intellectual boundaries
for these disputes were an outgrowth of the fact that discussion of transfer
pricing was limited to tax administrators and other specialists.91
In the last few years, however, transfer pricing, and the arm’s length standard
in particular, have become a source of substantial conceptual controversy.92 The
arm’s length standard drew attention from many sources outside the transfer-
pricing bar, including numerous expose´s in the popular press,93 legislative
hearings in multiple jurisdictions,94 and sustained attention from advocacy
groups claiming the mantle of “civil society.”95 As a result, transfer pricing
became a subject of discussion among high-level elected officials for the first
proposals existed before the onset of the BEPS project. See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Splitting the
Unsplittable: Toward a Formulary Approach to Allocating Residuals Under Profit Split 2 (U. Mich.
Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Paper No. 378, 2013) (proposing that the OECD use
formulary apportionment to allocate residual profit of the “profit split method”).
89. The transfer pricing dispute between the United States and the United Kingdom, involving the
valuation of certain marketing vs. manufacturing intangibles of Glaxo-Smith Kline, provides just one
particularly large dispute among an innumerable number of examples. See Audrey Nutt, Glaxo, U.S.
Settle Transfer Pricing Dispute, 43 TAX NOTES INT’L 956 (2006).
90. See Matthias Schro¨ger, Transfer Pricing: Next Steps in the International Debate, in TAX POLICY
CHALLENGES IN THE 21ST CENTURY 299, 310–12 (Raffaele Petruzzi & Karoline Spies eds., 2014).
91. Indeed, one refrain among some tax practitioners for many years was that the arm’s length
standard was the worst possible answer for transfer pricing, except for all proposed alternatives.
92. See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Between Formulary Apportionment and the OECD Guidelines:
A Proposal for Reconciliation, 2 WORLD TAX J. 3, 3 (2010) (arguing that although debate quieted with
regard to the arm’s length standard after the adoption of the 1995 regulations and OECD guidelines, the
arm’s length standard is unworkable and should be replaced by formulary apportionment); TJN
Statement on Transfer Pricing, TAX JUSTICE NETWORK (Mar. 21, 2012), http://taxjustice.blogspot.com/20
12/03/tjn-statement-on-transfer-pricing.html [https://perma.cc/KP6G-LEX9] (asserting that the “OECD’s
theory of the arm’s-length principle no longer applies to multinational enterprises which are highly
integrated”).
93. See, e.g., Jesse Drucker, Companies Dodge $60 Billion in Taxes Even Tea Party Condemns,
BLOOMBERG (May 13, 2010, 3:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2010-05-13/american-
companies-dodge-60-billion-in-taxes-even-tea-party-would-condemn [https://perma.cc/5EDP-X5EQ]
(“Transfer pricing lets companies such as Forest, Oracle Corp., Eli Lilly & Co. and Pfizer Inc., legally
avoid some income taxes by converting sales in one country to profits in another . . . .”).
94. Offshore Profit Shifting and the U.S. Tax Code—Part 2 (Apple Inc.): Hearing Before the S.
Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs,
113th Cong. 1 (2013) (statement of Sen. Levin, Chairman, Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations)
(noting, in conjunction with Sen. McCain, how “Apple effectively shifts billions of dollars in profits
offshore, profits that under one section of the tax code should nonetheless be subject to U.S. taxes, but
through a complex process avoids those taxes”).
95. Transfer Pricing, TAX JUSTICE NETWORK, http://www.taxjustice.net/topics/corporate-tax/transfer-
pricing/ [https://perma.cc/UGQ6-9WYG] (deploring the arm’s length standard and collecting sources
that advocate for formulary apportionment).
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time.96 In the process, preexisting norms developed by the community of
transfer-pricing specialists came under heavy (perhaps deserving) scrutiny.
The BEPS project then endorsed the idea that the existing transfer pricing
guidelines were broken, but failed to reach meaningful consensus on a clearly
delineated alternative. Views regarding the level of deference to be given
intergroup contractual arrangements diverged substantially, the consensus on
the scope for recharacterizing intergroup transactions frayed, the consensus on
respecting intergroup equity contributions declined, and disputes among govern-
ment officials about whether value creation in cross-border transactions under-
taken by MNCs should be attributed to capital, labor, the market, or even
government support are now aired routinely and publicly.97 At the same time,
enormous political pressures coming from the highest levels of government and
the G-20 meant that some sort of outcome in the transfer-pricing work of the
BEPS project was a political necessity.98 The result is a reliance on high levels
of constructive ambiguity buried in many pages of technocratic language in the
transfer-pricing outputs of the BEPS project.99 Indeed, the national delegates
and OECD officials that participated in negotiations of the revised transfer
pricing guidelines are already providing conflicting interpretations of those
outputs in public presentations.100
An important reason that transfer-pricing guidelines have become so much
more heavily contested is that the circle of stakeholders opining on the guide-
lines has broadened dramatically relative to the recent past. As late as 2007, it
would have been fair to describe transfer pricing as a kind of priesthood, where
subspecialists from OECD countries debated arcane pricing matters using a
specialized language that they found meaningful and that others left to their
purview. Today, NGOs and finance ministers alike, from countries within and
96. See, e.g., Arun Jaitley, Fin. Minister of India, Address at the Peterson Institute for International
Economics: Tax Reforms in India: Vision for the Future (Apr. 16, 2015); Stephen Timms, Fin. Sec’y to
Treas. U.K., Address at OECD Tax & Development Conference, Paris (Jan. 27, 2010); G-20, CANNES
SUMMIT FINAL DECLARATION—BUILDING OUR COMMON FUTURE: RENEWED COLLECTIVE ACTION FOR THE
BENEFIT OF ALL (Nov. 4 2011), http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2011/2011-cannes-declaration-111104-en.
html [https://perma.cc/X4GG-6EWQ].
97. See Mindy Herzfeld, Input Needed on Transfer Pricing Drafts, 77 TAX NOTES INT’L 392, 392
(2015); OECD, COMMENTS ON DISCUSSION DRAFT ON THE USE OF PROFIT SPLITS IN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBAL
VALUE CHAINS AND OTHER RELATED TRANSFER PRICING ISSUES: CHINA INTERNATIONAL TAX CENTER/IFA CHINA
BRANCH (2015). U.S. officials, for example, have bemoaned this phenomenon in multiple public
appearances.
98. See, e.g., Comments of Marlies de Ruiter, Interview: OECD’s de Ruiter Says Forthcoming
Changes to Transfer Pricing Guidelines Achieve Correct Balance, 24 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP.
729, 775 (Oct. 15, 2015).
99. See BEPS ACTIONS 8–10, supra note 87; see also Michael L. Schler, The Arm’s-Length Standard
After Altera and BEPS, 149 TAX NOTES 1149 (2015) (discussing ambiguities in the revised transfer
pricing guidelines associated with attributing income to various forms of activity, control of risk, or
something else).
100. Compare Comments of Marlies de Ruiter, supra note 98, with Comments of Brian Jenn, quoted
in Ryan Finley, Transfer Pricing Report Obscured by Terminology Jenn Says, 80 TAX NOTES INT’L 229,
230 (2015).
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outside the OECD, regularly opine on transfer-pricing matters. The public
consultations to the BEPS project for transfer-pricing-related matters alone
produced almost five thousand pages of formal comments. In this environment,
the transfer-pricing technocrats that participate in the OECD’s Working Party
No. 6 are much less free to reach conclusions separate and apart from external
political pressures. The result is likely to be more reliance on creative ambiguity
to reach “consensus” outcomes.101 Unfortunately, as Hugh Ault once wrote,
While creative ambiguity can at times be useful, masking important differ-
ences with bland platitudes is not helpful . . . . [I]f country A says the world is
flat and country B says the world is round, and after a long discussion, the
OECD issues a report that says the world is an attractive shape and declares a
consensus has been reached, it is difficult to call that real progress in establish-
ing international norms.102
Indeed, the lack of consensus on transfer-pricing norms—leading to agreed-
upon language that provides plausible support for a wide variety of audit
positions that could be taken by national tax administrations—is the primary
reason that the private sector, NGOs, and the OECD itself all have expressed
concern about a substantial increase in double taxation disputes.103 High public
salience on transfer pricing has produced broad agreement that the old system
did not work well, while a lack of shared natural interests among the strongest
states with respect to the relevant metrics for attributing value creation to a
jurisdiction forces technocrats to rely on creative ambiguity to mask key
tensions, thereby opening the door for substantial growth in transfer-pricing
101. Mindy Herzfeld’s relentless series of pointed questions posed to the leading OECD Secretariat
officials in charge of the transfer-pricing workstream within the BEPS project highlighted the level of
creative ambiguity required to release even some discussion drafts in this area. See Herzfeld, supra note
97. Multiple U.S. Treasury officials, including Robert Stack, Deputy Assistant Secretary (International
Tax), Michael McDonald, and Brian Jenn, have similarly bemoaned the lack of clarity in the transfer
pricing discussion drafts in multiple public panel appearances. See, e.g., Comments of Brian Jenn,
quoted in Ryan Finley, supra note 100.
102. Ault, supra note 31, at 763.
103. See, e.g., OECD, PUBLIC DISCUSSION DRAFT BEPS ACTION 14: MAKE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
MECHANISMS MORE EFFECTIVE 4 (2015), http://www.oecd.org/ctp/dispute/discussion-draft-action-14-make-
dispute-resolution-mechanisms-more-effective.pdf [http://perma.cc/8AY3-KSD6] (similar concerns about
increased disputes raised by EY and SAB Miller); OECD, COMMENTS RECEIVED ON PUBLIC DISCUSSION
DRAFT, BEPS ACTIONS 8, 9 & 10: REVISIONS TO CHAPTER I OF THE TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES
(INCLUDING RISK, RECHARACTERISATION, AND SPECIAL MEASURES) (2015), http://www.oecd.org/ctp/transfer-
pricing/public-comments-actions-8-9-10-chapter-1-TP-Guidelines-risk-recharacterisation-special-
measures-Part1.pdf [perma.cc/M844-PB8J] (BIAC Tax Committee, BusinessEurope, Deloitte, Interna-
tional Alliance for Principled Taxation, and the International Chamber of Commerce, among others,
raised concerns about an increase in double taxation disputes); GLOBAL ALLIANCE FOR TAX JUSTICE, KEY
POINTS ON TAX ISSUES FOR G20 SHERPAS MEETING JUNE 2015 G20 AND OECD MUST ACT TO PREVENT
FAILURE OF THE BEPS PROJECT (2015), https//bepsmonitoringgroup.files.wordpress.com/2015/06/key-
points-on-the-tax-issues-for-g20-sherpas-meeting-june-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/3A5W-R3DR].
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controversy.104 This outcome is consistent with past international financial law
projects, where high political salience in issue areas with distributive conse-
quences resulted in non-resolution of key disputes.105
B. WHERE DISTRIBUTIVE PROBLEMS ARE ABSENT, SOFT INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW
IS OFTEN EFFECTIVE
When regulatory questions are politically salient, scholars of international
finance emphasize that standards evolve in large part as a result of the exercise
of power by dominant states.106 As a result, standards may be most effective
when preferences align and distributive problems are largely absent or hidden
from view among the major economies.107 In such areas, logics of appropriate-
ness may continue to organize discourse among regulators. Even in these areas,
a modicum of enforcement is often needed if international coordination is to
succeed.
Some changes to the international tax environment recommended by the
BEPS project clearly reflect parallel domestic preferences among major econo-
mies and the absence of well-recognized distributive questions among those
parties. For example, the BEPS project includes work to make exchange of
information between states compulsory and automatic in certain cases when a
state provides a taxpayer-specific ruling related to a preferential tax regime.108
Most major economies share a preference for information about private rulings
issued to taxpayers by other states when that ruling has implications for the
treatment of a taxpayer in their country.109 Accordingly, OECD designed a
framework that specifies when an obligation for informing other countries about
such rulings arises.110
Similarly, the BEPS project includes disclosure rules in connection with
aggressive or abusive transactions, arrangements, or structures used by MNCs.111
The goal is to address asymmetry of information between taxpayers and tax
administrations.112 In order to achieve that goal, OECD recommendations
encourage governments to put mandatory disclosure regimes in place that
require taxpayers to disclose the use of certain tax planning “schemes,” as well
104. See, e.g., Kristen A. Parillo, Robert Stack–BEPS and the United States, 76 TAX NOTES INT’L
1055 (2014).
105. See infra note 190 for a discussion of the special place transfer pricing has in the Treaty-based/
non-Treaty-based divide.
106. See generally DREZNER, supra note 22; KRASNER, supra note 67, at 127–51; Helleiner &
Pagliari, supra note 54; Ethan B. Kapstein, Resolving the Regulator’s Dilemma: International Coordina-
tion of Banking Regulations, 43 INT’L ORG. 323 (1989).
107. Regulatory agreements intended to force public disclosure of information create non-
excludable benefits that are also largely non-rival among G-20 countries, thereby approaching a global
public good, which facilitates agreement.
108. See BEPS ACTION 5, supra note 81, at 489.
109. Id. at 46.
110. Id. at 47–53.
111. See BEPS ACTION 12, supra note 81.
112. Id.
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as the identity of the promoters of those schemes. The OECD then advances
specific enhanced models of information-sharing among tax administrations that
delineate aggressive tax-planning arrangements, so as to encourage effective
cross-border administrative assistance regarding these arrangements.113
In stark contrast to almost every other BEPS agenda item, governments,
MNCs, and NGOs objected only at the margins to compulsory spontaneous
exchange of information on tax rulings related to preferential regimes and
mandatory disclosure of aggressive tax-planning structures. Governments unani-
mously supported such information-forcing measures. The Business and Indus-
try Advisory Council’s statement that it “supports the development and use of
well targeted mandatory disclosure rules,” followed by suggestions for how best
practice recommendations should be structured, is representative of the private-
sector stakeholder reaction.114 Even the low volume of comments indicated that
these two information-sharing items were less important to the stakeholder
community relative to the remainder of the BEPS Action Plan.115
Compulsory exchange and mandatory disclosure regimes intended to cabin
special tax deals made between an MNC and a sovereign and aggressive MNC
tax planning reflect an intra-governmental consensus that puts information
exchange at the center of a more cooperative international tax system.116 The
advent of the Common Reporting Standard to address the taxation of offshore
accounts of individuals both underscores and has given impetus to this trend.117
Sovereigns are sharing administrative tools to enforce their tax laws, in order to
reassert more de facto control over their tax policies.118 Logics of appropriate-
ness associated with transparency drove agreements in principle on compulsory
exchange and mandatory disclosure, given the lack of obvious distributional
consequences, as well as the optionality provided to sovereigns with respect to
implementation of the mandatory disclosure rules.
Will those agreements amount to anything in practice? The work of the
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO)119 in coordinat-
ing mutual assistance for securities law enforcement among regulators in devel-
113. Id.
114. OECD, COMMENTS RECEIVED ON PUBLIC DISCUSSION DRAFT, BEPS ACTION 12: MANDATORY
DISCLOSURE RULES 26 (2015), http://www.oecd.org/tax/aggressive/public-comments-beps-action-12-
mandatory-disclosure-rules.pdf [https://perma.cc/47AS-UF2D].
115. Id. Compare the 873 pages of submissions on the Risk and Recharacterization Draft with the
275 pages of submissions addressing aggressive tax planning disclosures. See generally id.
116. Here I refer to the transparency dimension of Action 5 as well as the international tax planning
dimension of Action 12.
117. See Itai Grinberg, Does FATCA Teach Broader Lessons About International Tax Multilateral-
ism?, in GLOBAL TAX GOVERNANCE: WHAT IS WRONG WITH IT AND HOW TO FIX IT 157–74 (Peter Dietsch &
Thomas Rixen eds., forthcoming).
118. THOMAS RIXEN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TAX GOVERNANCE 5 (2008).
119. IOSCO is the primary institution tasked with setting international standards for securities
markets. About IOSCO, INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, http://www.iosco.org/about/?subsection!about_
iosco [https://perma.cc/24A4-5E9F]. IOSCO’s members are mostly public authorities and collectively
regulate more than ninety-five percent of the world’s securities markets. See id.
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oped countries provides an interesting analogy.120 IOSCO has been largely
successful in increasing securities enforcement cooperation among all IOSCO
members. IOSCO’s Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding Concerning
Consultation and Cooperation and the Exchange of Information (MMoU) offers
a common understanding of how signatories are expected to cooperate and
exchange information for the purpose of regulatory enforcement regarding
securities markets.121 Notably, the international financial law literature accounts
for IOSCO’s success by pointing to the large developed economies’ parallel
domestic preference for effective securities fraud enforcement and the absence
of substantial distributive issues among those countries.122
Nevertheless, IOSCO eventually adopted a mild coercive sanction to ensure
compliance with the standards built into the MMoU. In particular, a national
securities commission is only eligible for ordinary membership in IOSCO (and
the voting privileges such membership confers) if it is a signatory to the
MMoU. A “monitoring group” within IOSCO has discretion to consider and
recommend a range of possible options to “encourage” compliance in the event
that a signatory demonstrates an unwillingness to meet the MMoU provisions.123
The lesson is that even where preferences are aligned, some enforcement
mechanism is often needed to implement agreements reached under the G-20’s
international financial law architecture. In the context of compulsory exchange
and mandatory disclosure, major economies have parallel preferences for infor-
mation reporting. In the case of compulsory exchange of information on tax
rulings, they have agreed to a monitoring mechanism that involves annual
reviews of country practices to enforce compliance.124 Given that in this area
major power preferences are aligned, there is good reason to believe that
compliance may occur. Will smaller jurisdictions that may wish to continue
120. The Global Forum’s work on exchange of information for tax purposes provides another
important precedent for thinking through these issues. The focus of much of the Global Forum’s
work—the exchange of financial account information of offshore account holders between the country
of residence of a financial intermediary and the country of residence of a taxpayer—represents the real
substantive overlap between international tax and international financial law. See Grinberg, supra note
117.
121. Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Consultation and Cooperation and
the Exchange of Information, INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IO
SCOPD386.pdf [https://perma.cc/DZR6-U43H] (last visited Feb. 2, 2015). The MMoU includes vari-
ous substantive representations regarding domestic law and regulations. For instance, countries must
have rules regarding the confidentiality of information exchanged among securities regulators and
ensure that no domestic banking secrecy, blocking laws, or regulations will prevent securities regulators
from sharing various types of information with their counterparts in other jurisdictions.
122. Verdier II, supra note 77, at 146.
123. See Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 121. In 2013, IOSCO imple-
mented a “watch list” of countries that are non-signatories and began the process of considering further
coercive measures to affect the behavior of such countries. See id. The watch list was created to further
“assist” current IOSCO members that are non-signatories “in overcoming the obstacles they often
encounter in securing support from their governments or legislatures for implementing the legal and
regulatory changes required for compliance with the MMoU.” Id.
124. BEPS ACTION 5, supra note 81, at 68.
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offering opaque rulings be willing to ignore the rule? In the case of compulsory
exchange of information to other tax administrations about a well-specified
class of private rulings, reputational consequences and the implicit threat of
defensive measures taken against a defecting jurisdiction may be sufficient to
ensure widespread compliance.125
In contrast, the BEPS project final reports provide sovereigns with quite
unfettered optionality in implementing the proposed mandatory disclosure rules
vis-à-vis taxpayers.126 There is no clear expectation for when rules should be
implemented, so even expectations of reciprocity—the least coercive form of
pressure seen in international financial law-style efforts—will not play a role in
national implementation decisions. In these circumstances, one would expect
that countries would enact such rules only to the extent that they view it in their
national interest. Coordinated implementation of any kind or substantial improve-
ments in cross-border administrative assistance, as a result of these recommenda-
tions, will prove challenging in the absence of any enforcement mechanism.
A more difficult and instructive example regarding information exchange
comes from the agreements reached in the BEPS project to increase the
transparency of MNC transfer-pricing policies.127 The highest profile part of the
new system endorsed by the OECD and the G-20 is the so-called country-by-
country report (CBCR), which is intended to give tax administrations a picture
of where MNC profits are reported and where real activity takes place.128
The OECD considers the country-by-country report to be part and parcel of
its effort to improve transfer-pricing rules.129 OECD reports reason that in an
environment in which transfer pricing is increasingly contentious, widely ad-
opted documentation rules can reduce compliance costs for business while also
125. See Geert Lowagie, ECOFIN Agrees on Directive for Exchange of Information on Rulings,
DELOITTE (Oct. 7, 2015), http://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Tax/dttl-tax-
alert-europeanunion-7-october-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/4K2G-JMPU] (noting that the Council of
Finance Ministers in the E.U. reached an agreement on a proposed directive that would require
automatic exchange of information on certain tax rulings between E.U. member states); BEPS Country
Scorecards, DELOITTE (last updated Dec. 5, 2015), http://www2.deloitte.com/global/en/pages/tax/articles/
beps-country-scorecards.html [https://perma.cc/SX4H-TVAS] (“The Australian Taxation Office (ATO)
has commenced the automatic exchange of rulings under Action 5.”); cf. Oona Hathaway & Scott J.
Shapiro, Outcasting: Enforcement in Domestic and International Law, 121 YALE L. J. 252 (2011)
(showing that, in some instances, reputational concerns and the promise of reciprocity from large states
can be sufficient to engender state-level compliance; in other cases, “outcasting” mechanisms and
threats of sanctions are needed to enforce new international norms).
126. See BEPS ACTION 12, supra note 81, at 9.
127. Under the OECD’s newly agreed approach, transfer pricing documentation standards will
require MNCs to produce a country-by-country report, a master file, and a local file that will be
available to the tax administration of each country in which they do business. OECD, OECD/G20 BASE
EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT, TRANSFER PRICING DOCUMENTATION AND COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY
REPORTING 9 (2015), http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/download/2315381e.pdf?expires!1444702
130&id!id&accname!guest&checksum!360F46B811951BF5A278D995AB7A1520 [https://perma.
cc/65R4-3D6G] [Hereinafter BEPS ACTION 13].
128. Id. at 16.
129. See infra note 132.
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providing tax administrations with more focused and useful information for
transfer-pricing risk assessments and audits.130 However, the country-by-
country template takes an approach that comports more closely with so-called
formulary apportionment conceptions of transfer-pricing determination than
with the arm’s length standard as historically understood.131 The characteriza-
tion of CBCR as being ‘just about transparency’ and ‘discouraging the use of
cash boxes’ only somewhat obscures the fact that countries could use CBCR
data as an impetus to depart from the existing arm’s length standard for
substantive transfer-pricing enforcement.
Nevertheless, in stark contrast to other dimensions of the BEPS project
associated with transfer pricing, the country-by-country reporting rules and
other changes to information reporting were agreed to with relatively little
controversy between governments.132 Given how deeply objectionable CBCR
reporting has been for the private sector, and the high levels of disagreement in
revising substantive transfer-pricing guidance among governments, the ease
with which CBCR was agreed upon is quite striking.
The key lesson, consistent with the scholarship on international financial
law,133 is that in G-20-convened processes, transparency and information report-
ing will often be agreed to even when little else is possible.134 The simple
reason is that information reporting is not facially distributional. Like other
reporting regimes, revised reporting templates for transfer pricing affect tax
administration, but do not, at least as a first-order matter, change substantive
transfer-pricing standards or otherwise impact the international tax law of
jurisdictions around the world. The revised reporting templates for transfer
pricing can be defended as merely encouraging MNCs to avoid booking exces-
sive income in locations that tax administrators in major economies would
characterize as “tax havens.” As a result, CBCR can be plausibly characterized
130. See BEPS ACTION 13, supra note 127, at 11–12.
131. Formulary apportionment is a method of calculating tax liability through the use of a formula
that takes certain factors into account and allocates portions of a corporation’s worldwide net income
(income minus expenses) to a specific taxing jurisdiction. That jurisdiction then applies its tax rate to
the allocated portion of income. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Kimberly Clausing, A Proposal to Adopt
Formulary Apportionment for Corporate Income Taxation: The Hamilton Project 10–11 (Law & Econ.
Working Papers Archive: 2003–2009, Art. 70, 2007); see also Ajay Gupta, Country-by-Country
Reporting Inevitable, Global Leaders Say, 76 TAX NOTES INT’L 866, 867 (2014); Michael Sala,
Country-by-Country Reporting: Potential Audit and Legislative Risks for MNEs, 73 TAX NOTES INT’L
1127, 1128–29 (2014); BEPS Action Plan: Action 13–Transfer Pricing Documentation, PWC, http://www.
pwc.com/gx/en/tax/tax-policy-administration/beps/transfer-pricing-documentation.jhtml [https://perma.
cc/LW6G-DHTT].
132. The resistance to the country-by-country reporting template that emerged in the private sector
has received support from some members of the U.S. Congress. Nevertheless, for purposes of this
discussion, the key point is that the U.S. administration, along with other governments, agreed to this
reporting concept with relatively little resistance, and merely tried to shape the reporting template into
something that companies could comply with at a reasonable cost.
133. See Verdier, supra note 22.
134. Cf. Kal Raustiala & Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law, International Relations and
Compliance, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 538 (Walter Carlsnaes et al. eds., 2002).
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as merely strengthening national enforcement efforts in a nonrival manner
among major economies, such that the domestic preferences of tax administra-
tions should be aligned.
CBCR, like mandatory disclosure rules under Action 12, lacks even a mild
coercive measure agreed to at the international level to ensure compliance.
Accordingly, it is possible that some countries will defect from implementation
of CBCR in the post-BEPS environment.135 However, the pressures that can be
brought to bear by other sovereigns are important, as are the reputational
dynamics at play. The basic reality is that any sovereign could require the local
subsidiary of an MNC to report CBCR information on the activities of an entire
multinational group. Furthermore, after the BEPS project, such a sovereign
could point to international norms endorsing CBCR and providing a precise
template for how the information should be reported both to justify its reporting
requirements and to suggest that the MNC will already have developed systems
to collect the relevant data, since it will need to report CBCR information to one
country or another. Thus, noncompliance by any individual sovereign (even a
powerful sovereign like the United States) may not be effective.136
CBCR, therefore, offers an example where market pressure may allow a
subset of states—even a subset of states that are not usually thought of as
having hegemonic power—to, in practice, impose the implementation of a
global standard, without affirmatively coercing other states. Given that fact, as
in international financial law, reputational pressures associated with resisting
calls for transparency are likely to push jurisdictions toward conformity with
CBCR.137
135. Certain American practitioners and journalists can be understood to be calling on the United
States to make a decision to this effect. See, e.g., Mindy Herzfeld, Questions Remain About CbC
Reporting, 78 TAX NOTES INT’L 969, 971 (2015).
136. Indeed, the European Commission seems to recognize this dynamic: it proposed that all MNCs
operating in Europe be required to provide global CBCR data to European authorities regardless of
where the MNC is headquartered or whether such requirements are imposed in their home jurisdiction.
See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on Tax
Transparency to Fight Tax Evasion and Avoidance, at 5, COM (2015) 136 final (Mar. 18, 2015). Note
that the European Commission proposal would go one step further than CBCR as proposed by the
OECD. It would make CBCR data public, rather than treating it as confidential taxpayer information
available only to tax administrations. Given how abhorrent that result would be to the United States,
with its deeply entrenched commitment to taxpayer confidentiality, including corporate taxpayer
confidentiality, one might interpret the European Commission proposal as a kind of veiled threat against
the United States. Without making any normative judgment, the point I make here is merely that under
the circumstances this is a pretty effective threat.
137. See Verdier, supra note 22, at 1423; cf. BRUMMER, supra note 22, at 64. The agreement on a
modified nexus approach for IP regimes reached within the course of the BEPS project also creates
pressures that may, at least in the short term, lead to convergence around a common “patent box”
structure. The patent box issue is significantly more complicated than CBCR, in part because of the
prospect that countries may engage in mock compliance with the limitations on IP regimes put forward
under the modified nexus agreement, and in part because contrasting patent boxes with interest expense
allocation would raise questions around the issue of competitiveness. Space constraints prevent a more
fulsome discussion of the issue here.
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In contrast, consider a substantive tax subject area like interest expense
allocation.138 As Michael Graetz has observed, there appear to be limited
reasons for any country to want to provide deductions that encourage local
borrowing to finance foreign investment.139 The base erosion accepted by the
jurisdiction providing the deduction does not come with any obvious offsetting
benefits—benefits of the kind that local, direct investment, or research and
development spending might bring, for example.140 Given the linkages between
source-country and residence-country limitations on interest expense deduc-
tions, addressing the problem multilaterally through some allocation mechanism
is also normatively attractive from the perspective of a logic of appropriateness
grounded in a single tax principle.141 An initial understanding that there were
similar domestic preferences and limited distributional concerns among the
major economies therefore drove government officials to agree, in principle, on
the need for action in the area of interest expense allocation from the outset of
the BEPS project.142
Concrete concerns of specific jurisdictions and specific industries, however,
are likely to undermine implementation. If a group of high-rate countries
adopted a group-wide, interest-expense allocation rule, it could incentivize
MNCs to locate borrowing in other jurisdictions so much so that those other
jurisdictions might feel pressured to adopt similar limitations on interest deduct-
ibility to staunch revenue losses. However, that form of market pressure toward
consistent implementation likely requires collective movement by a significant
subset of jurisdictions.143 Increasing limitations on interest expense singlehand-
edly would likely increase the effective tax rate for affected businesses, but, in
contrast to a change in the tax rate, could do so to an extent that is hard to
138. Injecting related-party debt into a high-taxed subsidiary within a related-party structure, thereby
overleveraging high-tax subsidiaries relative to low-tax subsidiaries, may be the single simplest tax
planning strategy available to multinational enterprises. Cf. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANA-
TIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 2015 REVENUE PROPOSALS 49 (2014), http://www.treasury.gov/
resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/General-Explanations-FY2015.pdf [http://perma.cc/UW4R-A
FNN] [hereinafter FY 2015 GREENBOOK].
139. Michael J. Graetz, A Multilateral Solution for the Income Tax Treatment of Interest Expenses,
62 BULL. INT’L TAX’N 486, 490–91 (2008).
140. Moreover, when borrowing in a high-tax country and financing investments in a low-tax
country, the result is after-tax returns greater than the investment’s pretax returns—which, by definition,
decreases worldwide economic welfare through distorted capital allocations.
141. See Graetz, supra note 139, at 491–93. The conceptual appeal of a multilateral solution is
enhanced by the fact that sourcing inconsistencies or other rule asymmetries can result in disallowance
of interest deductions by a residence country jurisdiction that a source country may also disallow,
creating double and/or excessive taxation of a productive investment. As a result, the two issues of
residence countries’ limitations on interest deductions for borrowing to finance low-taxed, exempt, or
deferred foreign-source income and of source countries’ restrictions on interest deductions intended to
limit companies’ ability to strip income from a higher tax country into a lower tax one are linked. Id.
142. BEPS ACTION 4, supra note 80.
143. But see Martin A. Sullivan, A Proposal for the Tax Treatment of Interest in a Territorial System,
40 PEPP. L. REV. 1345, 1361 (2013) (arguing that unilateral adoption by the U.S. of interest allocation
rules would incentivize MNCs to shift borrowing outside the U.S. and that multilateral adoption would
level the playing field).
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predict ex ante and may not be consistent across industries. Meaningful unilat-
eral action by one jurisdiction might also asymmetrically increase effective
capital costs, leading to concerns regarding the competitiveness of domestic
firms. As a result, pressures to renege are more likely to arise from tangible fact
patterns than in the information-reporting context. Without meaningful enforce-
ment mechanisms, these distributional concerns create collective action prob-
lems that could undermine the effectiveness of any agreement as to standards,
or may motivate conversion of any such agreement into a more lenient re-
gime.144 Indeed, in recognition of this problem, the final BEPS report on
interest expense allocation includes only a “best practice” approach that pro-
vides a “corridor” of possible interest expense limitation ratios that is not only
binding, but nevertheless includes options for countries to jettison parts of the
approach.145
C. OVERCOMING IDENTIFIED DISTRIBUTIVE PRESSURES IS CHALLENGING
Soft international economic law can be effective even when the preferences
of major economies diverge. However, in these circumstances, national regula-
tors tend to take positions that reflect the interests of domestic constituencies.146
As a result, “the adoption of common standards . . . require[s] solving distribu-
tive problems where the interests of these constituencies diverge.”147 Significant
coercion will usually be required to achieve either agreement or effective
implementation.148 In most cases, therefore, distributive problems are likely to
remain unresolved, in principle or during implementation.
The OECD’s work regarding the design of CFC rules provides a case study
for the underlying principle that soft international economic law efforts are
unlikely to work when distributive problems exist among the major economies.
CFC rules tax a defined subset of income of a foreign subsidiary in the country
of residence of the parent. CFC rules have a close connection to the broader
question of whether a jurisdiction should generally tax all foreign-source in-
come earned by foreign subsidiaries of a corporation residing in its jurisdiction,
because CFC rules impose such a regime for a defined subset of income.149 U.S.
CFC rules go beyond those of many other countries by reaching various
categories of income deemed “highly mobile” under U.S. law.150
144. Cf. Verdier II, supra note 77, at 127.
145. See BEPS ACTION 4, supra note 80, at 20–21, 25.
146. Singer, supra note 23, at 535; Verdier II, supra note 77, at 142.
147. Verdier II, supra note 77, at 142.
148. See, e.g., Singer, supra note 23, at 535.
149. Most large economies have CFC rules that, at minimum, tax unrelated-party passive income
earned by foreign subsidiaries currently in the country of residence of the parent corporation. From
there, CFC rules vary widely. See DELOITTE, GUIDE TO CONTROLLED FOREIGN COMPANY REGIMES (2015),
http://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Tax/dttl-tax-guide-to-cfc-regimes-
210214.pdf [https://perma.cc/U28G-7RCK] (comparing CFC regimes).
150. Similarly, U.S. law departs from international norms by taxing U.S. MNCs on all profits earned
by their foreign subsidiaries when these profits are repatriated as dividends. Among the large,
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The United States went into the BEPS project strongly advocating the need to
address BEPS multilaterally through tighter CFC rules.151 If implemented
broadly, such changes would move all jurisdictions closer to imposing world-
wide systems for the taxation of foreign-source income earned by tax-resident
MNCs. The Obama Administration may have believed it could use the BEPS
project to pressure legislators at home and abroad in the direction of the
Administration’s worldwide minimum tax CFC rule ideal. Indeed, the United
States’ initial rationale for supporting the BEPS project may have rested on the
hope that it would create international pressure for tighter CFC rules.152
Analysis through the international financial law lens would have suggested
that this gambit of the Obama Administration was doomed to fail. Tighter CFC
rules are viewed as undesirable by a number of G-20 governments because of
their distributive consequences.153 On the one hand, tighter CFC rules primarily
increase tax revenues for countries that are the parent jurisdiction for substantial
numbers of MNCs. On the other hand, when a country’s CFC rules extend
beyond the scope of those imposed by other jurisdictions, they may impact
corporate residence and investment location decisions made by MNCs. Finan-
cial markets are paying increased attention to the tax consequences of corporate
developed economies, the United States is now alone in imposing this system of taxation on tax-
resident MNCs. The move away from so-called “worldwide” (deferral) tax systems to “dividend
exemption” systems in the developed economies has been driven both by competitive dynamics and
scholarship suggesting that exemption systems are economically preferable to worldwide regimes. See,
e.g., Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines Jr., Evaluating International Tax Reform, 56 NAT’L TAX J. 487,
496 (2003); Eric Drabkin, Kenneth Serwin & Laura D’Andrea Tyson, Implications of a Switch to a
Territorial Tax System in the United States: A Critical Comparison to the Current System 1 (Berkeley
Research Grp., Working Paper, 2013), http://www.thinkbrg.com/media/publication/391_BRG_
Implications%20of%20Territorial%20Tax_Nov2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/BQ6N-PLZD].
151. Moreover, both immediately prior to the launch of the BEPS project and shortly thereafter, the
Obama Administration made proposals domestically to substantially tighten the CFC rules applicable to
U.S.-incorporated MNCs. The major proposal at the time the BEPS project was launched was to tax
currently to the parent corporation (as subpart F income) all “excess returns” of controlled foreign
subsidiaries of U.S. MNCs. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S
FISCAL YEAR 2011 REVENUE PROPOSALS 43 (2010), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/
documents/general-explanations-fy2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/P9V5-UM49] [Hereinafter FY 2011 GREEN-
BOOK]. Depending on the details, if enacted, this rule could have moved the U.S. international tax
system quite close to a true worldwide tax system. For fiscal year 2015, the Obama Administration
abandoned its excess returns proposal in favor of its current “minimum tax” proposals, which also
involve strengthening CFC rules. FY 2015 GREENBOOK, supra note 138, at 58, 60.
152. See generally Manal S. Corwin, David R. Tillinghast Lecture on International Taxation: Sense
and Sensibility: The Policy and Politics of BEPS (Sept. 30, 2014), in TAX NOTES, Oct. 2014, at 139–40;
Tax Policy: U.S. Tax Reform Efforts Must Be Informed by International Fight Against Base Erosion,
DAILY TAX REP. (Dec. 11, 2012), http://news.bna.com/dtln/DTLNWB/doc_display.adp?fedfid!2886801
7&vname!dtrnot&jd!a0d5q4q4y5&split!0 [https://perma.cc/2FYZ-EANK] (quoting then-Deputy As-
sistant Secretary for International Tax Affairs Manal Corwin).
153. Cf. Dhammika Dharmapala, Base Erosion and Profit Shifting: A Simple Conceptual Framework
10 (U. Chi. Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 703, 2014), http://chicagounbound.
uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article!2377&context!law_and_economics [https://perma.cc/Y6VJ-
JLBY] (helping lay groundwork for quantifying the extent of base erosion).
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residence.154 Moreover, corporate residence is at least partially elective, so that
CFC rules adopted by any state can be circumvented over time.155 As a result,
the tax rules affecting outbound investment by an MNC create important and
potentially distortive consequences for ownership structures, in addition to
affecting the allocation of capital and national well-being.156 Defection from
any agreement on tighter CFC rules may produce substantial benefits in terms
of the location of headquarters activities and highly skilled employment opportu-
nities for the defecting jurisdiction.157 As a result, other jurisdictions with
sufficient market weight were not prepared to lend substantive support to the
Obama Administration’s proposals.158 Indeed, for many years, CFC rules have
mainly been relaxed rather than strengthened around the world.159
Given the potential distributive consequences associated with CFC rules, the
history of international financial law teaches that any effort to encourage
implementation of tighter CFC rules by sovereigns would only be likely to
succeed if nonimplementation were to carry substantial unfavorable conse-
quences. For example, the Basel I Accord160 on capital adequacy for financial
institutions was, in an important sense, redistributive. During the Latin Ameri-
can debt crisis of the 1980s, the US and UK felt compelled to bail out
154. See Amanda Athanasiou, U.S. Drug Companies Seeing Green in Irish Inversions, 75 TAX NOTES
INT’L 351 (2014); Ajay Gupta, Market Bets Against Retroactive Anti-Inversion Legislation, 75 TAX
NOTES INT’L 1122 (2014); Ajay Gupta, Investment Banks Playing Inversions from Both Sides, 75 TAX
NOTES INT’L 895 (2014).
155. See Daniel Shaviro, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture: The Rising Tax-Electivity of U.S.
Corporate Residence, 64 TAX L. REV. 377, 402 (2011); see also DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, FIXING U.S.
INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 7 (2014).
156. See, e.g., Mihir A. Desai & Dhammika Dharmapala, Do Strong Fences Make Strong Neigh-
bors?, 63 NAT’L TAX J. 723 (2010); Desai & Hines Jr., supra note 150; Mihir A. Desai & James R.
Hines Jr., Expectations and Expatriations: Tracing the Causes and Consequences of Corporate
Inversions, 55 NAT’L TAX J. 409 (2002).
157. Cf. HM TREASURY, CORPORATE TAX REFORM: DELIVERING A MORE COMPETITIVE SYSTEM 14 (2010)
(“Reform of the UK’s Controlled Foreign Company (CFC) rules is frequently identified by UK
multinational businesses as the key priority needed to improve the UK’s tax competitiveness.”).
158. In the international financial law area, IOSCO’s efforts to adopt uniform capital rules for
securities firms reached a parallel demise twenty years earlier. These rules were effectively defeated by
divergent domestic preferences in the U.S. and the U.K. After the 1987 market crash, the U.K. faced
domestic pressures to raise capital adequacy standards for securities firms. Moreover, the U.K. made a
strong case that doing so internationally in a coordinated fashion would reduce systemic risk. However,
U.S. regulators did not face the same pressures and saw competitive threats to U.S. securities firms
from movement towards consolidated supervision. Given U.S. market power, U.S. resistance alone was
enough to defeat agreement at IOSCO. Verdier, supra note 22, at 1450.
159. See, e.g., Thorton Matheson, Victoria Perry & Chandara Veung, Territorial vs. Worldwide
Corporate Taxation: Implications for Developing Countries (IMF Working Paper, 2013), http://www.imf.
org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/wp13205.pdf [https://perma.cc/M2FC-QHUF]; Mike Williams, Dir., Bus.
& Int’l Tax, U.K. Treas., Remarks at Corporate Inversions and Tax Policy Panel, The Brookings Inst.
(Jan. 23, 2015), http://www.brookings.edu/!/media/events/2015/01/23%20corporate%20inversions/201
50123_corporate_tax_inversions_transcript.pdf [https://perma.cc/7NDP-LLRA]. For instance, the U.K.
government, among others, has changed its corporate tax regime over time to focus more on profits
from U.K. activity in determining the tax base rather than attributing the worldwide income of a group
to the U.K. in order to make the U.K. an attractive headquarters jurisdiction for international investment.
160. For a general description of the Basel Accords, see supra note 77.
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Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico in order to indirectly rescue their own banks,
which had loaned heavily to these countries, from the potential consequences of
sovereign debt defaults.161 Regulators in both countries then came under pres-
sure to raise capital adequacy standards for domestic banks in order to limit the
opportunity for banking concerns to socialize the cost of bad loans again at a
future date.162 The Basel Accord effectively shifted part of the potential cost of
these increased capital adequacy requirements (reduced competitiveness of U.S.
and U.K. banking concerns internationally) onto the Japanese, French, German,
and Swiss banks that were the primary competitors of U.S. and U.K. financial
institutions at that time. The adoption of the Basel I Accord over the resistance
of other countries was thus a function of relative power.163 At the time, the
dominance of U.S. and U.K. financial markets was such that by threatening to
exclude noncompliant foreign banks from their markets, those two powers alone
were able to overcome countervailing interests.164
However, the United States was largely alone from the beginning in pushing
for tighter CFC rules. Nor did it propose a coercive device that would change
the calculus for other states. Moreover, given constraints imposed by the
Treaties on the Functioning of the European Union, as interpreted by the
European Court of Justice, even if some European members of the G-20 had an
interest in tightening CFC rules, they could not agree to any unfavorable
consequences for nonimplementation of CFC recommendations.165 Perhaps for
that reason, a little more than a year into the BEPS project, the International Tax
Counsel of the United States publicly suggested that moral suasion rather than
coercion was the most likely mechanism by which compliance with CFC
recommendations might be obtained.166 That suggestion effectively constituted
an acknowledgment that the effort to establish meaningful OECD standards for
161. See, e.g., WOLFGANG H. REINICKE, BANKING, POLITICS AND GLOBAL FINANCE: AMERICAN COMMER-
CIAL BANKS AND REGULATORY CHANGE, 1980–1990, 142 (1995).
162. SINGER, supra note 22, at 29–30.
163. Verdier II, supra note 77, at 136.
164. Id.
165. In the landmark case Cadbury Schweppes v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue, the European
Court of Justice (ECJ) effectively held that CFC rules that operate automatically and do not permit a
corporate taxpayer to exercise his freedom of movement within the European Union infringe on a
fundamental economic freedom guaranteed by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
Case C-196/04, Cadbury Schweppes, PLC v. Comm’rs of Inland Revenue, 2006 E.C.R. 1-7995; As a
result, CFC rules for European MNCs, at least for their operations within Europe, are illegal under
European law unless they are targeted at what the ECJ terms “wholly artificial arrangements.” Lilian V.
Faulhaber, Sovereignty, Integration and Tax Avoidance in the European Union: Striking the Proper
Balance, 48 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 177, 179 (2010). The tighter CFC rules envisioned by the Obama
Administration in the United States likely would not pass ECJ scrutiny if imposed in a European
jurisdiction with respect to activity by CFCs in other member states (or EFTA states). In this context,
arguments from the United States and the OECD that CFC rules have positive spillover effects in
source countries because taxpayers have less of an incentive to shift profits into low-tax jurisdictions
were bound to be unavailing.
166. Danielle Rolfes, Int’l Tax Counsel U.S. Treasury Dep’t, Remarks at Georgetown University
Law Center Panel: BEPS, CFC Rules, Patent Boxes, and E.U. Law (Oct. 2, 2014).
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tightened CFC rules was over, only halfway through the project.167 The BEPS
final report on CFC rules provides a series of caveated statements acknowledg-
ing that the policy objectives of CFC rules will vary between jurisdictions,
while attempting to defend the proposition that CFC rules continue to play some
role in domestic rules addressing cross-border taxation.168
D. PATH DEPENDENCE MATTERS WHEN NATIONAL ACTION IS SUFFICIENT
Path dependence, meaning the trajectory over time of the understandings
reached among national representatives in multilateral settings, can also affect
outcomes, particularly when substantial implementation of agreed-upon rules is
possible through national action alone. In these cases, agreements supported by
a strong logic of appropriateness may be effective even once major countries
focus on nonaligned distributive outcomes.
Consider the OECD work intended to “neutralise the effects of hybrid
mismatch arrangements.”169 These arrangements involve the use of hybrid
instruments or hybrid entities to produce a taxpayer-favorable inconsistency in
the tax treatment of a transaction across two jurisdictions.170 One example
involves an entity that is treated as making a deductible payment to a related
party under the laws of the payor jurisdiction but is disregarded as separate from
its owner under the laws of the payee jurisdiction, such that the payment is not
included in income in the payee jurisdiction.171 Similarly, a financial instrument
may be viewed as debt in one jurisdiction and as equity in the other. Depending
on the tax laws of the jurisdictions in question, payments on the instrument
could be characterized as deductible interest in the payor jurisdiction and as a
nontaxable dividend in the payee jurisdiction.172 The basic rationale of appropri-
ateness underlying the hybrid mismatch initiative is to ensure matching of
income and deductions across international boundaries in much the same way
that such matching is often achieved within domestic income tax regimes. This
single tax principle is at the heart of the policy coherence narrative of the BEPS
project.
167. Id.; see also, e.g., Kristen A. Parillo, BEPS Interest Report Will Recommend Fixed Ratio,
148 TAX NOTES 527 (2015); DBriefs Bytes Transcript, DELOITTE DBRIEFS (Oct. 10, 2014),
http://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/About-Deloitte/Dbriefs_bepscentral/
dbriefs_script_10oct2014_a3.pdf [https://perma.cc/39NZ-BSAC].
168. BEPS ACTION 3, supra note 79, at 13–18.
169. BEPS ACTION 2, supra note 78.
170. Id. The principal hybrid mismatches identified by the OECD are payments that are deductible
under the rules of the country of the payor and not included in the income of the recipient (deduction/no
inclusion outcomes) and payments that give rise to duplicate deductions as a result of a single
expenditure (double deduction outcomes). Id. at 17–18.
171. Id. at 50.
172. Similarly, an entity that is viewed as transparent under the laws of one jurisdiction and opaque
under the laws of another jurisdiction may lead a single payment made by the hybrid entity to be
deductible in two jurisdictions. The OECD project’s scope is limited to arrangements where a mismatch
in treatment is caused by the hybrid element and the mismatch in tax outcomes lowers the aggregate tax
paid by the parties to the arrangement. Id. at 54.
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Agreement in principle about the appropriateness of curtailing hybrid plan-
ning was reached in 2012, before the tax treatment of the cross-border activity
of multinational enterprises had morphed into a political issue worthy of
attention at the G-20.173 The initial outcome was largely a product of techno-
cratic regulatory consensus among tax administration professionals. The major
exception to technocratic focus was the United States: President Barack Obama
gave a speech that targeted hybrid arrangements of U.S. MNCs in 2009.174 As a
first-order matter, these arrangements reduced the amount of foreign tax, rather
than U.S. tax, paid by U.S. MNCs,175 so a focus on limiting U.S. companies’
use of hybrid arrangements was arguably at odds with national interest. Indeed,
eventually the Obama Administration withdrew its 2009 domestic budget pro-
posal to curtail taxpayers’ ability to create hybrid entities via the “check-the-
box” rules.176 However, given the political direction established by the Obama
Administration, U.S. technocratic officials working at the OECD took positions
that were consistent with both the logic of appropriateness developed in that
multilateral, technocratic context and the President’s domestic political rhetoric.
They approved guidance in March 2012 recommending that foreign sovereigns
take action to change their laws to counteract the benefit of hybrid mis-
matches.177 At this stage, expressed preferences among major markets were
aligned and distributive concerns had been put aside.
When the BEPS process was launched, the March 2012 principles were
translated into a highly prescriptive BEPS output.178 Eventually, practitioners
made clear that in practice, implementation could disproportionately impact
U.S.-based MNCs. U.S. officials began to think in terms of logic of conse-
173. OECD, HYBRID MISMATCH ARRANGEMENTS: TAX POLICY AND COMPLIANCE ISSUES 13–14 (2012),
http://www.oecd.org/tax/exchange-of-tax-information/HYBRIDS_ENG_Final_October2012.pdf [https://
perma.cc/Z5QJ-Y8MF].
174. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on International Tax Policy Reform (May
4, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-The-President-On-International-Tax-
Policy-Reform [https://perma.cc/4S8Y-HMJA].
175. International Tax Issues Relating to Globalization: Hearing Before Comm. of Finance, 106th
Cong. 107 (1999) (written statement of Multinational Tax Coalition). But see Edward D. Kleinbard,
Stateless Income, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 699, 755–56 (2011); Edward D. Kleinbard, The Lessons of Stateless
Income, 65 TAX L. REV. 99 (2011).
176. Compare U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR
2010 REVENUE PROPOSALS 28 (2009), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/
General-Explanations-FY2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/26U5-PTLD], with FY 2011 GREENBOOK, supra
note 151. That decision was consistent with a respected Treasury economist’s well-read finding that the
benefits of eliminating check-the-box would inure as a revenue matter largely to foreign sovereigns.
Harry Grubert & Rosanne Altshuler, Fixing the System: An Analysis of Alternative Proposals for the
Reform of International Tax, 66 NAT’L TAX J. 671, 673, 696 (2013) (arguing that “repeal of check-the-
box would result in companies unwinding hybrids in tax havens and sheltering income in countries with
rates below the U.S. rate”). See also FY 2015 GREENBOOK, supra note 138, at 61 (targeting hybrid
mismatches only in circumstances where U.S. deductions could be denied and therefore U.S. revenue
increased). The check-the-box rules allow MNCs to elect whether certain entities are treated as either a
corporation, or a partnership or disregarded entity for U.S. federal income tax purposes.
177. OECD, HYBRID MISMATCH ARRANGEMENTS, supra note 173.
178. BEPS ACTION 2, supra note 78.
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quences: their particular concern was that the BEPS recommendations in this
area would prioritize source-country taxation and not require countries to defer
to residence-country taxation under CFC rules. Consequently, the adoption of
these recommendations to curtail hybrid planning would result in U.S. MNCs
paying more in taxes to foreign sovereigns than to the United States.179 At this
point, however, it was too late for U.S. officials to change course. Prior
acceptance of the logic of appropriateness associated with addressing hybrid
mismatches (to ensure single taxation) constrained the scope for diplomatic
action by U.S. technocrats. Thereafter, countries began adopting legislation
intended to implement the outcome of the OECD’s work on hybrids, even
before the BEPS project officially drew to a close.180 The outcome demonstrates
both how the logic of appropriateness matters and how path dependence affects
the outcomes in international financial law-style processes when implementa-
tion is a matter of national action rather than international agreement.
E. MOCK COMPLIANCE IS ONE LIKELY RESPONSE
Compliance with international standards by nation-states and private actors
can be superficial rather than substantive. Faced with international financial
law-style standards, some nation-states may gravitate toward mock compli-
ance.181 At the most obvious level, mock compliance involves combining
formalistic implementation with alternative relief for regulated actors. Mock
compliance can also be achieved through systematic regulatory forbearance;
informal, administrative nonenforcement; and private compliance failures that
go undetected.182
For instance, after the Asian crisis of 1997–1998, Indonesia, Malaysia, South
Korea, and Thailand came under intense external pressure to transform their
financial regulatory regimes to comply with new international standards.183
However, substantive third-party monitoring of their responses to the new
international standards was difficult to achieve. As a result, each of these
countries was largely able to defuse external pressure by engaging in cosmetic
legal and regulatory changes that did not fundamentally alter the regime under
which domestic enterprises and financial institutions functioned.184
179. See Grubert & Altshuler, supra note 176, at 709 (given that U.S. rates are higher than the rates
in almost all other jurisdictions, “companies would unwind their hybrids and prefer to pay the generally
lower host country rates rather than the full U.S. rate”).
180. EY, THE LATEST ON BEPS—2014 IN REVIEW: A REVIEW OF OECD AND COUNTRY ACTIONS IN 2014,
at 3 (2015), http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/The_latest_on_BEPS_-_2014_in_review/
$FILE/2015G_CM5236_The%20Latest%20on%20BEPS%20%E2%80%93%202014%20in%20Review.
pdf [https://perma.cc/5L3D-K6EJ].
181. WALTER, supra note 22.
182. Id. at 29–33.
183. Those countries were not party to the standard-setting bodies that were tasked with crafting
these standards and had no influence on their content.
184. See WALTER, supra note 22. Somewhat similarly, although agreement at the level of principle
was reached at the FSB on central clearing mechanisms for OTC derivatives with regulation imposed
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Similarly, dynamic responses to the BEPS project that could be characterized
as mock compliance are already starting to emerge. For instance, the Swiss
Federal Council (the Swiss executive branch of government) has proposed a
“Federal Law on Measures to Maintain the Competitiveness of Business Loca-
tion Switzerland.”185 The explicit purpose of this legislation is to repeal Swiss
law facilitating tax planning of the type targeted by BEPS before the BEPS
project is complete, and to simultaneously open other avenues for companies to
minimize their tax burden if they locate principal company and financing
activity in Switzerland. Key features of the proposed legislation included a
Swiss patent box at the cantonal level and a “notional interest” deduction on
so-called surplus equity of Swiss companies applicable at both the federal and
cantonal levels.186
Ireland is similarly undertaking tax reform that is intended to maximize
competitive advantage within the broad constraints imposed by BEPS out-
comes.187 Belgium already has a notional interest deduction that can be used to
circumvent the limitations that would come into being even if every country
followed the recommendations of the OECD in the area of interest deductibility.
These are just a few examples. Even if the OECD were to take steps to change
international standards again to try to counter the impact of legal adaptations in
Ireland, Switzerland, and elsewhere, there will likely be further legislative
strategies available for small, open economies interested in maintaining their
competitiveness for foreign direct investment. Some level of regulatory forbear-
ance in jurisdictions interested in attracting revenue, employment, or both,
should also be expected, and constitutes another avenue for mock compliance.
by the country of residence, unilateral actions since the time of that agreement have encouraged local
clearing mechanisms and greater host country regulation. See HELLEINER, supra note 83, at 16; see also
Andrew Walter, Adopting International Financial Standards in Asia: Convergence or Divergence in the
Global Political Economy?, in GLOBAL FINANCIAL INTEGRATION THIRTY YEARS ON: FROM REFORM TO
CRISIS 95, 100 (Geoffrey R. D. Underhill et al. eds., 2010) (describing mock compliance in Korea).
185. See Tax Insights from International Tax Services: Switzerland Publishes Corporate Tax Reform
III, PWC, (Sept. 26, 2014), http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/tax-services/publications/insights/assets/pwc-
switzerland-publishes-corporate-tax-reform-iii-consultation.pdf [https://perma.cc/73VE-NCXK]; see also
EY , GLOBAL TAX ALERT: SWISS CORPORATE TAX REFORM III—NATIONAL COUNCIL APPROVES REVISED BILL
(March 18, 2016), http://www.ey.com/GL/en/Services/Tax/International-Tax/Alert—Swiss-Corporate-T
ax-Reform-III–National-Council-approves-revised-bill.
186. See Tax Insights from International Services, supra note 185, at 1.
187. Ireland issued an “Update on Ireland’s International Tax Strategy” as part of its 2015 budget.
GOV’T OF IR., DEP’T OF FINANCE, UPDATE ON IRELAND’S INTERNATIONAL TAX STRATEGY (2015), http://www.
budget.gov.ie/Budgets/2016/Documents/Update_on_Irelands_International_Tax_Strategy_pub.pdf [https://
perma.cc/EL35-RPNJ]. The proposal includes a new “Knowledge Development Box,” increased tax
amortization for IP assets, R&D tax credit enhancements, a “Special Assignee Relief Programme” that
incentivizes non-Irish executives to move to Ireland by offering them reduced income tax rates at the
individual level, and other steps intended to maximize the probability that in a post-BEPS environment
MNCs will relocate both income and high-paying jobs out of high-tax jurisdictions and put them in
Ireland. Id. at 7.
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F. FINAL OBSERVATIONS
The lessons described above paint a realist picture. Yet, in the context of
international financial law, even realist analysts point out that purely consequen-
tialist thinking faces certain constraints.188 Regulators may find it difficult to
make an accurate ex ante assessment of the costs and benefits of agreeing to a
proposed new international standard or of complying with that standard. It may
not be clear to the regulator which domestic groups’ interests to take into
account or which economic or political theory to use to determine how to weigh
those interests. Finally, it is unclear how far-sighted regulators can be in
calculating costs and benefits. To the extent regulators must comply with
politicians’ wishes or are heavily influenced by the political environment, they
may weigh the short- or medium-term quite heavily. All these factors make
outcomes difficult to predict, and more than just a consequence of the interplay
of national interests and legal and procedural constraints.
Moreover, given all the uncertainty a regulator faces, debates about interna-
tional standards can act as a kind of focal point. Indeed, law firms and
accounting firms around the world now routinely catalogue the various national
proposals that are vaguely related to outcomes of the BEPS project, even as
they depart from the details thereof.189 When a multilateral project is suffi-
ciently politically salient, even an inconclusive part of the project may matter
because it can act as a locus for subsequent domestic policy debates.
III. BREAKING BEPS IN TWO: THE SPECIAL STATUS OF THE OECD MODEL TREATY
Many of the limitations on coordinating international tax governance de-
scribed in Part II result from the multistep nature of building successful regimes
using the international financial law model. Agreements reached internationally
must be implemented domestically through legislative or regulatory action.
States may have incentives to agree in principle at the international level and
then fail to implement domestically.
188. WALTER, supra note 22.
189. See, e.g., EY, A REVIEW OF OECD AND COUNTRY ACTIONS IN 2014, supra note 180; KPMG,
OECD BEPS ACTION PLAN TAKING THE PULSE IN THE ASIA PACIFIC REGION (2014), http://www.kpmg.com/
Global/en/services/Tax/addressing-the-changing-tax-environment/Documents/taking-the-pulse-in-the-
asia-pacific-region.pdf [https://perma.cc/55CM-J4ND]; BEPS Country Scorecards, supra note 125
(providing updates on country activity on BEPS by regions). Just a few examples can give one a sense
of the range of government activity. New laws relating to registration of providers of digital services
were recently enacted by India, Israel, and Italy in relation to BEPS Action 1 (which addresses tax
challenges related to the so-called “digital economy”). Italy recently legislated to deny the use of a
cost-plus method for transfer pricing for entities who sell online advertisement services. Antihybrid
rules on both inbound and outbound payments in the EU and in Australia are inspired by, but not
entirely consistent with, the letter of the recommendations incorporated in the output of Action 2 of the
BEPS project. A variety of countries have already modified thin cap rules or introduced interest caps,
even though none have followed the approach suggested in the discussion drafts associated with Action
4 of the Action Plan. All of these national actions have been linked to discussions that took place in the
BEPS project, but none follow OECD recommendations.
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The OECD Model Treaty is a soft-law instrument, and in that sense agree-
ments to change the OECD Model Treaty are similar to agreements reached in
international financial law-style processes. However, in contrast to international
financial law-type agreements, changes to the OECD Model Treaty and its
commentaries (the “Commentary”) impact the legal and administrative out-
comes in international tax directly. Not only are the OECD Model Treaty and
Commentary (together, the “OECD Model”) highly influential; in some respects
changes to the OECD Model are automatically incorporated into domestic law
and administrative practice in many countries around the world. As a result,
agreements on and compliance with changes to the OECD Model are subject to
many fewer pressures than OECD recommendations that take a form similar to
international financial law.
The procedural and institutional dynamics of both the BEPS project and
future multilateral efforts in international tax should therefore be analyzed by
bifurcating proposed solutions based on whether or not they are Model Treaty-
based. There are fundamentally different institutional dynamics for international
tax efforts that rely on the bilateral tax treaty architecture as opposed to
international financial law-style solutions.
The treatment of the OECD Model (particularly the Commentary) by both
national courts and tax administrations make the negotiation of treaty-based
changes to the OECD Model akin to a single-stage negotiating game among
states. For Model Treaty-based changes, the political economy dynamics de-
scribed in Part II may apply to negotiation of soft law at the multilateral level,
but do not apply to implementation of that soft law.190 Marrying the political
efficacy of G-20-convened soft-law processes with the legal efficacy of changes
190. Indeed, in the area of substantive transfer pricing guidance, high political salience has created a
political economy dynamic analogous to the one seen in recent years in international financial law. See
supra notes 89–107 and accompanying text. Transfer pricing is a special case: it is linked to the treaties,
because the arm’s length standard is part of Article 9 of the OECD Model. However, transfer pricing
sits between Model Treaty-based and non-Treaty-based guidance for purposes of this Article. The
reason is two-fold. First, the OECD has created extensive Transfer Pricing Guidelines (running over
350 pages and expanding to almost 500 after the BEPS project) that interpret the arm’s length standard
outside the Commentary. In many jurisdictions, the physical separation of the Guidelines from the
Commentary has led courts and tax administrations to think of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines
as a distinct soft-law instrument with a different persuasive status than the Commentary. Second, in
contrast to the Commentary, sovereigns around the world have adopted detailed domestic transfer
pricing rules that address the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines in quite varied ways. For example, the
Nigerian Income Tax Regulations specify that they are to be “applied in a manner consistent with” the
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines “as supplemented and updated from time to time.” Income Tax
(Transfer Pricing) Regulation No. (1) (2012), § 11 (Nigeria), http://pwcnigeria.typepad.com/files/firs-
draft-tp-regulation_april-2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/B84V-CE87]; see also Tanzania Income Tax (Trans-
fer Pricing) Regulations (2014), § 9 (Tanzania), http://www.tra.go.tz/tax%20laws/Income%20Tax-T
ransfer%20Pricing%20Regulation.pdf [https://perma.cc/TWB5-BL8S]. In contrast, for countries like
the United States, Brazil, India, and China, the transfer pricing guidance process at most involves
evaluating changes to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines at the administrative level and determin-
ing whether or not to incorporate them into domestic law. For the purposes of this footnote, the key point is
merely that the political economy dynamics described in Part II apply to negotiation of the transfer pricing
guidelines regardless of whether they apply to implementation of that soft law in any given state.
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to the OECD Model is powerful. In this regard, it is also important to recognize
that most countries either have a “monist” view of law, in which international
treaties are superior to domestic statutes, or are more averse to treaty overrides
than the United States has been over time.191 Thus, Model Treaty-based BEPS
outputs are likely to endure over time.192 Moreover, the boundary between
OECD Model Treaty-based issues and other issues is also likely to be durable in
the medium term. The commitment by eighty countries to a novel OECD
project to amend bilateral tax treaties using a multilateral instrument only
strengthens this claim.
Thus, one should anticipate that agreements reached in the BEPS project
pertaining to treaty abuse, permanent establishment rules, and the treaty-based
aspects of reining in hybrid planning—all of which involve changes to the
OECD Model—are likely to be implemented around the world over time. This
result applies even though these changes to the OECD Model have distributive
consequences (for instance by reinforcing source country taxation and dispropor-
tionately impacting Silicon Valley), and neither coercive nor market pressures to
ensure adoption of the OECD Model are in place. In this sense, the OECD
Model Treaty acts as an independent variable that affects international tax
governance and differentiates the political economy of international tax affairs
from those that apply in international financial law.
In contrast, those parts of the BEPS Action Plan that are based on an
international financial law-style model are more akin to a multi-stage game.193
In the absence of agreed-upon coercive enforcement mechanisms, pressures to
comply with agreements in these areas will come from the marketplace or from
regional governance arrangements (notably the EU), or will simply be ab-
sent.194 As a result, the relevance of agreements that are not OECD Model
Treaty-based within the BEPS project will be determined at the national level,
in the post-BEPS period.
A. TREATY-BASED ELEMENTS OF THE BEPS PROJECT ARE MORE LIKELY TO BE EFFECTIVE
AND FACE FEWER PRESSURES THAT LIMIT AGREEMENT OR COMPLIANCE
Bilateral tax treaties are agreements between two jurisdictions to coordinate
the exercise of their taxing rights as contained in their respective domestic laws
191. See, e.g., John H. Jackson, Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy Analysis, 86
AM. J. INT’L L. 310, 314 (1992).
192. Furthermore, most OECD and G-20 countries are either parliamentary democracies or autocra-
cies. The resulting single-party control of the parliament and the administration tends to mean that if the
government negotiates a tax treaty change, it does not face other significant hurdles to ratification.
193. Cf. Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42
INT’L ORG. 427 (1988).
194. Although not a focus of this paper, it is important to note that the OECD sometimes acts as an
alternative venue in which Member States of the European Union debate issues of relevance to
intra-EU politics. The outcome parts of the BEPS project that are not Model Treaty-based may
therefore be imposed on EU Member States through mechanisms for asserting pressure that are unique
to the EU, and function only vis-a`-vis EU states.
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and set out clear ground rules that govern tax matters relating to cross-border
trade and investment.195 They provide relative certainty to taxpayers regarding
the threshold questions of whether a taxpayer’s cross-border activities will
subject the taxpayer to taxation by both countries, protect taxpayers from
potential double taxation through the allocation of taxing rights between the two
countries, reduce withholding taxes that are imposed at source, and include
provisions addressing specialized situations and administrative cooperation be-
tween taxing authorities.196 Over the course of the twentieth century, countries
around the world entered into a network of over 3,000 bilateral tax treaties that
address these issues.197 The existing treaty network is largely based on a few
model treaties. By far the most commonly used model is the OECD Model
Treaty.198
The OECD Model exercises an unusual gravitational pull in shaping the legal
interpretation of bilateral tax treaties within the domestic legal systems of
countries around the world. The special status of the OECD Model results from
three interlocked features of international tax policy, administration, and jurispru-
dence in a large number of states. First, at least within the OECD, tax treaty
negotiators feel substantially constrained to accept OECD Model Treaty provi-
sions in their future negotiations with other sovereigns where they have not
registered a reservation or observation with respect to a given OECD Model
Treaty provision. Second, the manner in which domestic courts199 and tax
administrations200 in many countries around the world treat the Commentary
substantially prewires an enforcement mechanism for changes to the OECD
195. See Klaus Vogel, Double Tax Treaties and Their Interpretation, 4 INT’L TAX & BUS. LAW. 1
(1986).
196. See I.R.S. Pub. No. 54, ch. 6, Tax Guide for U.S. Citizens and Resident Aliens Abroad, Tax
Treaty Benefits (2015), http://www.irs.gov/publications/p54/ch06.html [https://perma.cc/Y843-FYJ3].
197. MULTILATERAL INSTRUMENT, supra note 8; see SHAVIRO, FIXING U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAXATION,
supra note 155, at 7 (highlighting the oddity of focusing on juridical double taxation by observing that
a taxpayer would rather be taxed twenty times at one percent than once at thirty-five percent).
198. The OECD Model can, in turn, be traced back to the work of the International Chamber of
Commerce and the League of Nations in the 1920s, as well as to Model Treaties issued in 1943 and
1946 by the League of Nations. To a lesser extent, the United Nations Model Double Taxation
Convention between Developed and Developing Countries (the UN Model) is used as a model in
negotiations between developed and developing countries.
199. See, e.g., Tribunal Fiscal de la Nacion Argentina [TFN] [Fiscal Tribunal of Argentina],
11/31/1980, “La Industrial Paraguaya Argentina S.A. / recurso de apelacio´n,” (Arg.), http://
losalierisdejarach.com.ar/la-industrial-paraguaya-argentina-s-a-s-recurso-de-apelacion/ [https://perma.cc/
96QS-AYZX] (in absence of a definition in the “ley de impuesto a los re´ditos,” sala C of the
Argentinean Tax Court cited the definition of permanent establishment contained in the OECD Model
Treaty to define the concept “permanent establishment” under Argentinian law, despite the fact that
Argentina was not a member of the OECD).
200. For example, the Chilean Revenue Service, during the period that Chile was a non-OECD
member, issued a circular indicating that the OECD Model and Commentary’s interpretation of the
concept of “beneficial owner” should be used to interpret Chile’s tax treaties because Chile intended to
follow the OECD Model interpretation in this regard. Chilean Revenue Service, Circular Letter No. 57
(Oct. 16, 2009).
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Model Treaty,201 despite its technical status as soft law. Third, the “ambulatory
theory” of treaty interpretation endorsed by the OECD, tax administrations, and
national courts in various states, means that, as a practical matter, agreements to
amend the Commentary, either in conjunction with or independent of changes to
the OECD Model Treaty, significantly alter the legal meaning of existing and
future tax treaties.
1. Tax Treaty Negotiators Feel Substantially Constrained
Most OECD member countries assume that the relevant OECD Model Treaty
provision is the starting point for tax treaty negotiations between two states
unless one of the countries involved in the negotiation has entered a reservation
with respect to the provision in question.202 Moreover, countries around the
world rely on the OECD Model Treaty as a starting point for tax treaty
negotiations, even when they are not members of the OECD.203
It is often difficult for smaller jurisdictions to attempt to use something other
than the OECD Model Treaty as a starting point for negotiations. For instance,
Colombia, a non-OECD member, tried at one point to put forth its own model.
After the negative response from Colombia’s trade partners, the Colombian
Model was quickly abandoned, and negotiations were restarted, generally using
the OECD Model Treaty.204
201. For example, the tax treaty between Colombia and Chile, both non-OECD members at the time
their treaty was negotiated, indicates that both States agree that when their treaties use the language of
the OECD Model, the Commentary to the OECD Model should be considered as complementary means
of interpretation of the treaty under the terms of Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties of 1969, regardless of the fact that the two countries are non-OECD members. Corte
Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], Sentencia C-577/2009 (Colom.), http://www.
corteconstitucional.gov.co/RELATORIA/2009/C-577-09.htm [https://perma.cc/R3D3-SJ5D].
202. The weight given to the OECD Model explains why countries acceding to the OECD are
thorough in documenting their reservations and observations regarding the OECD Model. See, e.g.,
Gov’t of the Rep. of Chile, Agreement on the Terms of Accession of the Republic of Chile to the
Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-Operating and Development (Nov. 19, 2009),
http://www.oecd.org/chile/44381035.pdf [https://perma.cc/59WZ-ESBB].
203. Pasquale Pistone, General Report, in THE IMPACT OF THE OECD AND UN MODEL CONVENTIONS ON
BILATERAL TAX TREATIES 2 (Michael Lang et al. eds., 2012); see also, e.g., Chilean Revenue Service,
Circular Letter No. 8 (Jan. 26 2005) (clarifying that Chile’s treaties with Brazil, Canada, Ecuador,
Mexico, Norway, Peru, Poland, South Korea, and Spain were based on the model prepared by the
OECD, even though Chile was not a member of the OECD); Wei Cui, China, in THE IMPACT OF THE
OECD AND UN MODEL TAX CONVENTIONS ON BILATERAL TAX TREATIES, supra, at 261–62 (“China has
ninety-one income tax treaties in effect . . . . [I]ts first tax treaty . . . took effect barely a quarter of a
century ago . . . . [A]s China had started from a virtual tabula rasa insofar as tax treaties are concerned,
however selective it has attempted to be, its borrowings from the Models inevitably took on a wholesale
character.”). Some countries—notably Brazil and India—emphatically reject the idea that they rely on
the OECD model to any notable extent. See, e.g., Luis Eduardo Schoueri & Natalie Matos Silva, Brazil,
in THE IMPACT OF THE OECD AND UN MODEL CONVENTIONS ON BILATERAL TAX TREATIES, supra, at 172.
204. Natalia Quinones Cruz, Colombia, in THE IMPACT OF THE OECD AND UN MODEL CONVENTIONS
ON BILATERAL TAX TREATIES, supra note 203, at 294.
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2. Domestic Courts and National Tax Administrations Often Enforce the OECD
Model
There is no single, generally accepted view on the legal status of the
Commentary.205 However, the Commentary is used by the national courts of
many countries to interpret the meaning of their bilateral tax treaties.206 These
courts frequently rely on Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Interpreta-
tion of Treaties (Vienna Convention), for instance treating the OECD Model
Treaty and Commentary as part of the context of the treaty or as providing
special meaning for terms in the treaty, or as a supplementary means of
interpretation of the treaty under Article 32 of the Vienna Convention.207 U.S.
205. John F. Avery Jones, The Effect of Changes in the OECD Commentaries after a Treaty is
Concluded, 56 BULL. FOR INT’L FISCAL DOCUMENTATION 3 (2002).
206. For example, the Supreme Administrative Court of Finland has held that “[t]he wording of the
Commentaries, as it was at the time the tax treaty was negotiated between the parties of the treaty, are
especially important when interpreting the tax treaty in question . . . changes made to the Commentaries
thereafter are also of importance as a means of interpretation in the spirit of the Vienna Convention.”
KHO 2002:26, Supreme Administrative Court of Finland, requoted and translated in Kristiina A¨ ima¨ et
al., Finland, in THE IMPACT OF THE OECD AND UN MODEL CONVENTIONS ON BILATERAL TAX TREATIES,
supra note 203, at 389–90; see also Nat’l Westminster Bank PLC v. United States, 44 Fed. Cl. 120
(Fed. Cl. 1999) (examining the commentary to the OECD Model Treaty from which language found in
the U.S.–U.K. tax treaty was drawn, the Court held that the IRS was not allowed to determine the
income of the U.S. branch of a U.K. bank by substituting an IRS regulatory formula for interest
expense disallowance in place of the individualized arm’s length standard determination required under
the treaty).
207. Even non-OECD countries’ courts rely on the Commentaries. See supra note 201. Courts in
many states rely on Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the interpretation of treaties for the
proposition that bilateral tax treaties should be interpreted in light of the OECD Model Treaty and its
commentaries. Many courts accept the observation that the enormous amount of work that every OECD
country puts into making and changing the Commentaries suggests that states concluding tax treaties
would, in the absence of an observation, intend their treaties to be interpreted in accordance with the
Commentaries. As a result, the Commentaries are often accorded the status of the context or a special
meaning for terms in the treaty in the sense of Articles 31(2) and (4) of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties providing interpretive guidance for treaty adjudication. Jones, supra note 205, at 3. But
see MICHAEL LANG, TAX TREATY INTERPRETATION 25–27 (Kluwer Law International 2001) (criticizing the
use of the OECD Model Convention Commentary as a tool of interpretation within the meaning of
Article 31(2) or 31(4) of the Vienna Convention); Michael Lang & Florian Brugger, The Role of the
OECD Commentary in Tax Treaty Interpretation, 23 AUSTL. TAX F. 95, 99 (2008). Moreover, in states
that are signatories to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the Vienna Convention is
generally viewed as reflecting customary international law. Therefore, the justification for using the
Commentary to interpret existing bilateral tax treaties is extended even to treaties with partner countries
that have not signed the Vienna Convention. See, e.g., Thiel v. Comm’r of Taxation, (1990) 171 CLR
338, 350, 356 (Austl.) (“Whilst the Model Convention and Commentaries may not strictly amount to
work preparatory to the double taxation agreement between Australia and Switzerland, they are
documents which form the basis for the conclusion of bilateral double taxation agreements of the kind
in question and, as with treaties in pari materia, provide a guide to the current usage of terms by the
parties. They are, therefore, a supplementary means of interpretation to which recourse may be had
under Art. 32 of the Vienna Convention . . . . [B]ecause the interpretation provisions of the Vienna
Convention reflect the customary rules for the interpretation of treaties, it is proper to have regard to the
terms of the Convention in interpreting the Agreement, even though Switzerland is not a party to that
Convention . . . .”). Countries that are not signatories to the Vienna Convention, like France and the
United States (which publishes its own comprehensive technical explanation for every tax treaty it
signs), similarly acknowledge that the Commentary acts as a means of interpretation for tax treaties.
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courts are an outlier in this regard; they tend to rely less extensively on the
Commentary because the United States—uniquely among major sovereigns—
publishes a highly detailed technical explanation of its tax treaties at the time
each such treaty is sent to the United States Senate for ratification.208
Tax administrations in many OECD countries explicitly support consulting
the OECD Model to determine the meaning of their own treaties.209 The OECD
Model Treaty and Commentary as amended therefore influence the way tax
administrators understand the meaning of their treaties. Indeed, tax authorities
frequently seek to justify their interpretations of their own tax treaties in tax
litigation as being in accordance with the Commentary.210
Importantly, the Commentary is, with surprising frequency, taken into consid-
eration by national courts in many jurisdictions regardless of whether the text of
the bilateral tax treaty before the court exactly matches the language of the
OECD Model Treaty.211 The practice of using the Commentary to interpret
bilateral treaties even when the language of the two instruments differs is
sufficiently common across the world that some preeminent tax treaty scholars
claim that it is standard practice for countries to interpret their treaties in
accordance with the OECD Model Treaty and Commentary, unless it is clear
See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding, Interpretation of the Convention, AUSTRIA–U.S., July 20,
1996 (“It is understood that provisions of the Treaty that are drafted according to the corresponding
provisions of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Model Tax
Convention on Income and on Capital shall generally be expected to have the same meaning as
expressed in the OECD Commentary thereon . . . . The Commentary—as it may be revised from time to
time—constitutes a means of interpretation in the sense of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties of May 23, 1969.”)
208. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE
AVOIDANCE OF DOUBLE TAXATION AND THE PREVENTION OF FISCAL EVASION WITH RESPECT TO TAXES ON
INCOME, U.S.–Pol., Oct. 8, 1974, 1067 U.N.T.S. 243 (technical explanation dates from 2013); U.S.
DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE AVOIDANCE OF DOUBLE
TAXATION AND THE PREVENTION OF FISCAL EVASION WITH RESPECT TO TAXES ON INCOME AND CAPITAL (2010)
(pending), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Documents/Treaty-Technical-E
xplanation-Chile-2-4-2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/55PH-DDVA].
209. For instance, the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) takes the position that “the Commentar-
ies . . . provide important guidance on interpretation and application of the OECD Model and as a
matter of practice will often need to be considered in interpretation of [Australian tax treaties], at least
where the wording is ambiguous, which . . . is inherently more likely in treaties than in general
domestic legislation.” Interpreting Australia’s Double Taxation Agreements 2001 TR 2001/13 (Austl.),
http://law.ato.gov.au/atolaw/view.htm?Docid!TXR/TR200113/NAT/ATO/00001 [https://perma.cc/Z5Y
5-8N42]; Decree of the Ministry of Finance of Austria (17 Nov. 17 1995); see also OECD, COMMENTAR-
IES ON THE ARTICLES OF THE MODEL TAX CONVENTION [OECD MODEL COMMENTARY], ¶ 29 (2010) (“[T]ax
officials give great weight to the guidance contained in the Commentaries.”).
210. See, e.g., Catherine Brown & Martha O’Brien, Canada, in THE IMPACT OF THE OECD AND UN
MODEL CONVENTIONS ON BILATERAL TAX TREATIES, supra note 203, at 208.
211. For example, the Canadian Supreme Court has described both the OECD Model Treaty and its
Commentaries as a highly persuasive source of interpretation for provisions of its tax treaty with the
United States, even in connection with provisions where the language of the U.S.–Canada treaty does
not match the language of the OECD Model. Crown Forest Indus. Ltd. v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 802
(Can.); see also Richard Vann, Interpretation of Tax Treaties in New Holland, SYDNEY L. SCH. LEGAL
STUD. RES. PAPER NO. 10/21 (2010) (discussing reliance on the Commentaries and Model in the Lamesa
case in Australia).
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that a different meaning was intended.212
3. The “Ambulatory Theory” of Tax Treaty Interpretation in Effect Alters the
Meaning of Past Agreements over Time
Finally, substantial support exists in many states for an “ambulatory” ap-
proach to tax treaty interpretation. Under the ambulatory approach, later-in-time
Commentary provisions can be used to interpret tax treaties entered into before
the time at which the Commentary was agreed upon. Various commentators
have criticized the legal justifications for this approach.213 Nevertheless, the
Commentary, which has been universally endorsed by OECD states, explicitly
endorses an ambulatory approach to tax treaty interpretation.214 Furthermore,
the Vienna Convention provides some justification for the ambulatory ap-
212. FRANCISCUS ANTONIUS ENGELEN, INTERPRETATION OF TAX TREATIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
445–47 (2004). Moreover, there is no reason to believe these practices will change in an environment
characterized by higher political salience of international tax matters. Judges are relatively insulated
from political pressures, and have a compelling need for detailed guidance when interpreting tax
treaties, such that preexisting judicial practices involving reliance on Commentary are unlikely to be
changed by heightened political awareness regarding international tax matters. See also Vogel, Double
Tax Treaties, supra note 195, at 42 (stating that “if [] the language of the OECD Model is not adopted
literally, but a formulation is adopted that permits an interpretation consistent with the model . . . a
presumption arises, nevertheless, that an interpretation consistent with the OECD Model should
apply”).
213. See, e.g., C. GABARINO, MANUALE DI TASSAZIONE INTERNAZIONALE 205 (2d ed. 2008); M. Gunkel &
B. Lieber, Abkommensrechtliche Qualifikation von Sondervegutungen, 82 Finanz Rundscau (F.R.) 853,
858 (2000) (Ger.); Jones, supra note 205. As a matter of principle, it seems clear that commentaries
published after a treaty has been entered into cannot be treated as part of the intention of the original
treaty negotiators, or be an agreement made in connection with the conclusion of the treaty, or contain a
special meaning to which the parties had agreed.
214. OECD, MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL 2010, ¶¶ 33–34, 36 (2012),
http://www.oecdbookshop.org/browse.asp?pid!title-detail&lang!EN&ds!&k!5K9FMRG5LQBQ
[https://perma.cc/A5EU-XSPR]. The Commentary makes a caveat to this point by stating in paragraph
35 that changes to the Commentaries are not meant to be relevant where amendments to the Model are
different in substance from prior versions of the Model. Id. ¶ 35. However, the OECD has generally
approached this issue by asserting that changes to the Model are consistent with the intent of prior
versions of the Model. Thus the “principal purpose test” added to the OECD Model in Action 6 of the
BEPS Action Plan is described as a “rule, which incorporates principles already recognised in the
Commentary on Article 1 of the OECD Model Tax Convention.” OECD, OECD/G20 BASE EROSION AND
PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT, PREVENTING THE GRANTING OF TREATY BENEFITS IN INAPPROPRIATE CIRCUMSTANCES
¶ 26 (2015), http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/download/2315331e.pdf?expires!1445997950&id!
id&accname!guest&checksum!63856E744A494DEBD5B633E4208244D6 [https://perma.cc/7MAU-
PP8Y] [hereinafter BEPS ACTION 6]; see infra note 218 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., OECD,
COMMENTARY ON ARTICLE 4, CONCERNING THE DEFINITION OF RESIDENT, COMMENTARIES ON THE ARTICLES OF
THE MODEL TAX CONVENTION ¶ 8.4 (2010) (stating that although the Model was amended in 1995 to treat
contracting states as themselves “residents” for treaty purposes, the Model Treaty before that time
intended the same result). But see Maarten J. Ellis, The Influence of the OECD Commentaries on Treaty
Interpretation—Response to Prof. Dr Klaus Vogel, 2000 IBFD BULL., 617, 618 (“[I]t seems to me that
the OECD Fiscal Committee and the Commentary making a statement that new versions of the Model
and new versions of the Commentary should be used as proper means of interpretation of older treaties
remind me of Baron of Mu¨nchhausen pulling himself out of a morass by his own hair. I find it very
surprising that such a group of—be it authoritative—people can determine how authoritative they
themselves shall be . . . .”).
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proach.215 Indeed, some tax administrations separately affirm their support for
the ambulatory approach in domestically issued guidance documents. Further-
more, many countries administer their tax treaties consistently with the current
Commentary.216 Importantly, courts in various states routinely engage in ambula-
tory interpretation, using later-in-time Commentary to interpret the meaning of
tax treaty provisions concluded before the Commentary language was writ-
ten.217 Thus, the ambulatory approach to understanding tax treaties to a large
extent shapes the meaning of the law as much as the text of the treaty itself.
The deference that treaty negotiators, courts, and tax administrations of many
states give to the OECD Model provides a built-in enforcement mechanism for
the Model Treaty-based portions of international tax law. This enforcement
mechanism is substantially more effective than the enforcement mechanisms
known in international financial law, despite the fact that the OECD Model, like
international financial law instruments, is a form of soft law. Moreover, mock
compliance by state actors is less of a concern in international agreements
reached with respect to the OECD Model than it is outside the treaty area
because treaty language is fully observable, both taxpayers and tax administra-
tions may rely on OECD Model-based interpretive arguments in court, and
judges in most jurisdictions are genuinely independent of the administrative
state. At the same time, in the face of the political imperative created by G-20
convocation and the application of international financial law-style pressures, in
215. See Vann, supra note 211, at 7.
216. See, e.g., Interpreting Australia’s Double Tax Agreements, supra note 209, ¶ 108 (“[C]hanges to
the Commentaries reflect the fact that the Commentaries are usually expressed not as forming an
agreement between countries as to a new meaning but as reflecting a common view as to what the
meaning is and always has been . . . . [U]nless the Commentaries make clear that a former interpreta-
tion has actually been substantively altered, rather than merely elaborated, the ATO considers it
appropriate, as a matter of practice, to consider, at least, the most recently adopted/published OECD
Commentaries . . . . Often, if a DTA provision is to be fully understood, the changes that have occurred
to the relevant OECD Commentaries over time will need to be examined and considered.”).
217. For instance, the Norwegian Supreme Court explicitly justified using the current Commentary
to the OECD Model in a case wherein they were interpreting a tax treaty that was concluded before that
Commentary had been agreed in connection with a tax treaty with a non-OECD Member. See
Norwegian Supreme Court (Høyesterett) in ruling of 8th June 2004 in the case PGS, HR-2004-1003-A,
Rt. 2004, p. 957, UTV-2004-649 (relying on the then-current Commentary to the OECD Model to
interpret an earlier tax treaty with the Ivory Coast in connection with the question of whether
performing seismic and electromagnetic services could create a permanent establishment). The Cana-
dian tax court held that later-in-time OECD documents could be used as extrinsic aids to interpretation
of past tax treaties in the context of the U.S.–Canada treaties’ rules regarding beneficial ownership and
the treatment of U.S. limited liability companies. TD Securities (USA) LLC v. The Queen, [2010]
D.T.C. 1137 (Can.). In contrast, the Administrative Supreme Court of France has ruled that it is not
necessary to refer to commentaries that are adopted after a given tax treaty is negotiated in interpreting
the tax treaty. See CE Sect., Dec. 30, 2003, No. 233894, SA Andritz, www.rajf.org/spip.php?article2235
[https://perma.cc/453T-22EV]; see also Hugues Perdriel Vaissie`re & Emmanuel Raingeard de la
Ble´tie`re, France, in THE IMPACT OF THE OECD AND UN MODEL CONVENTIONS ON BILATERAL TAX TREATIES,
supra note 203, at 429. But even in jurisdictions where courts have held that they do not take later
OECD Commentaries into account, textual analysis suggests that such commentaries are often con-
sulted simply to cope with the difficulty of some treaty interpretation questions that arise. Id. at 430; see
also 78a INT’L FISCAL ASSOC., INTERPRETATION OF DOUBLE TAXATION CONVENTIONS 63–65 (1993).
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the BEPS project, tax treaty negotiators feel constrained from expressing their
traditional hesitancy to reach agreement to changes to the OECD Model or from
asserting reservations where they are disinclined to agree with a majority.218
The combination of the legal efficacy traditionally associated with the OECD
Model and the political efficacy associated with an international financial
law-style process is what makes it so likely that the Model Treaty-based
components of the BEPS project will be implemented. As a result, negotiations
that result in changes to the OECD Model Treaty and Commentary in effect
approach a one-stage legal game.219 Compliance and enforcement is relatively
certain when agreement on these soft-law changes is reached. Longstanding
bureaucratic processes in national tax administrations and interpretive tools
used by domestic courts do much of the hard work of implementation.
B. EXAMPLES OF HOW CHANGES TO THE OECD MODEL CAN BE SELF-ENFORCING
1. Proposed Changes to the Permanent Establishment Rules
Changes proposed by the BEPS project to the “permanent establishment”
(PE) threshold in the OECD Model Treaty provide an example of how changes
to the treaty-based portions of international tax law’s “soft” architecture can
become self-enforcing.
Tax treaties specify when an enterprise based in one state has a sufficient
connection to another state to justify taxation by the latter state. A sufficient
connection exists when an enterprise resident in one state (the residence state)
has a permanent establishment in another state (the source state). The perma-
nent establishment threshold must be met before the source state may tax that
enterprise on active business income properly attributable to that enterprise’s
activity in the source state. An important definitional approach taken in the
OECD Model Treaty is to specify certain activities that do not constitute a
permanent establishment. Accordingly, Article 5(4) of the OECD Model Treaty
enumerates certain “specific activity exemptions” that are assumed to contribute
only marginally to the profits of an enterprise, and therefore are thought not to
warrant taxation by that jurisdiction. For example, Article 5(4) provides that the
maintenance of a stock of goods or merchandise belonging to the enterprise, and
the use of facilities solely for the purpose of storage or delivery of goods or
merchandise belonging to the enterprise, do not constitute a permanent establish-
218. The United States is in fact threatening at this time to make a reservation on the permanent
establishment rules being negotiated as part of the BEPS project. However, it is the only jurisdiction
making this threat, and the importance of that threat is limited, given U.S. MNCs’ reliance on
foreign-to-foreign planning, as described earlier. See supra Section I.B.
219. Cf. James D. Fearon, Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation, 52 INT’L ORG.
269, 295 (1998) (arguing, outside a technocratic context, that when states expect a regime to be strong
and long-lasting, they will drive harder bargains and take longer to reach them).
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ment.220 The specific activity exemption approach is intended to provide busi-
nesses with greater certainty as to when they should expect to be taxed in a
source state, while improving administrability by limiting the need for case-by-
case determinations.
In the BEPS project, however, many countries focused on the idea that
technological progress (especially the Internet) and the globalization of business
have made it easier to be heavily involved in the economic life of another
jurisdiction, without meeting the historic permanent establishment threshold. As
a result, the BEPS project modifies the permanent establishment threshold as it
previously appeared in the current OECD Model Treaty. One key change
modifies the definition of a permanent establishment so as to make each of the
specific activity exemptions subject to a “preparatory and auxiliary” limitation.
Under this limitation, each of the specific activity exceptions only apply if the
given activity has a preparatory or auxiliary character taken in the context of the
business enterprise as a whole.221
At the level of multilateral negotiation of soft law, this represents a case
where preferences were aligned among major economies, with one significant
outlier: the United States. Outside of a G-20-convened process, it is quite likely
that strident opposition from the United States would have been sufficient to
prevent the consensus required for adoption of such a change in the permanent
establishment rules in the OECD Model Treaty.222 However, G-20 convocation
gave other countries the willingness and ability to force through changes to the
OECD Model Treaty. Even though the United States will not adopt the new
preparatory or auxiliary rule in its treaties,223 its reluctance is unlikely to be of
much practical effect, as a result of the U.S. MNCs’ high reliance on foreign-to-
foreign tax planning,224 in combination with the unusual efficacy of the OECD
Model.225
220. OECD, MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL ART. 5(4)(A), (B) (2014), http://www.
keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/taxation/model-tax-convention-on-income-and-on-capital-
condensed-version-2014_mtc_cond-2014-en#page24 [https://perma.cc/7LG3-GPFH].
221. See OECD, OECD/G20 BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT, PREVENTING THE ARTIFICIAL
AVOIDANCE OF PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT STATUS 28 (2015), http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/
download/2315341e.pdf?expires!1444706082&id!id&accname!guest&checksum!191D5B1FF6112
7C435F6E3FF9902DC62 [https://perma.cc/59NH-JS8E] [hereinafter BEPS ACTION 7].
222. Unlike almost any other state, the United States has never reserved on any Article or paragraph
of the OECD Model Treaty. One way to understand this result is that outside G-20 processes, U.S.
opposition to a provision in the OECD Model Treaty was considered enough to block the “consensus”
required for a change to be agreed to in the Model (whereas the same was not always true of opposition
from other states). In the context of the BEPS project, however, it appears that consensus will be
achieved on changes to the PE provisions by allowing the United States to enter a reservation. That
“solution” to achieving consensus has been used before with other states, but not with the United
States.
223. Cf. BEPS ACTION 7, supra note 221, ¶ 30.1.
224. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
225. In other words, because of the predominance of foreign-to-foreign tax planning, the new
preparatory or auxiliary rule in the foreign-to-foreign treaties will be the operative rule faced by U.S.
MNCs.
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The built-in enforcement mechanisms for the OECD Model suggest that
when new PE rules are adopted in the OECD Model Treaty—as is generally
expected—tax administrations and courts are likely to apply them to some
significant degree, regardless of when countries modify their tax treaties to be
consistent with the new OECD Model Treaty. Indeed, various governments are
already claiming that the permanent establishment rules in the current OECD
Model Treaty are consistent with the idea that the specific activity exemptions
are subject to a preparatory or auxiliary limitation.226 Perhaps tellingly, Amazon—
arguably the company most obviously affected by the addition of the prepara-
tory and auxiliary limitation on the specific activity exemptions on the use of a
facility for storing and delivering merchandise to customers—recently changed
the structure of its operations in a number of European jurisdictions so as to
unambiguously subject themselves to tax on a net basis on sales in those
jurisdictions.227 Presumably they did so after judging that the OECD Model
changes would be sufficiently self-enforcing that the wiser course was to avoid
audits and litigation over whether they do or do not have permanent establish-
ments in many of the jurisdictions in which they provide customers with goods.
2. Proposed Changes to Combat Treaty Abuse: The Limitation on Benefits
Provision
Some changes to tax treaty-based rules are sufficiently broad that it seems
unlikely that these changes could be imputed into existing treaties by courts (or
tax administrators) on the basis of changes to the OECD Model without an
226. For instance, the Israeli Tax Authority recently put out a Draft Circular that suggests that the PE
exceptions provided under paragraphs a) through d) of Article 5(4) of the OECD Model Treaty are
subject to the additional requirement that the activities referred to in that section are of only an
“auxiliary” nature. See New Israeli Tax Guidance on On-line Activity of Foreign Companies, Newsletter
No. 194977 (MEITAR, Ramat Gan, Isr.), Apr. 2015. Government officials from jurisdictions as diverse
as Germany and India have publicly articulated similar views. These claims are being made despite the
fact that the preparatory and auxiliary language in Article 5(4)(e) and 5(4)(f) of the OECD Model
Treaty quite clearly provides an additional exception to permanent establishment status, rather than a
limitation on the availability of the other exceptions to permanent establishment status. The discussion
of the Commentary to Article 5(4) of the OECD Model Treaty as it stood as of 2014 highlights the
intended effect of the preparatory and auxiliary language in Art. 5(4)(e) and 5(4)(f). The Commentary
provides that “[w]here each of the activities listed in subparagraphs a) to d) is the only activity carried
on at a fixed place of business, the place is deemed not to constitute a permanent establishment.”
Commentary on Article 5, OECD MODEL COMMENTARY, ¶ 5 (2014). Note that this sentence was added to
the Commentary in 2011 after specifically considering the question as to whether each of the exceptions
in subparagraphs a) through d) should be subject to a preparatory and auxiliary limitation. At the time,
that suggestion was rejected. Instead, text was added to the Commentary to clarify that no such
limitation was intended or had ever been in place. See OECD, INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF
ARTICLE 5 (PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT) OF THE OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION, ¶ 74 (2012), http://www.
oecd.org/tax/treaties/48836726.pdf [https://perma.cc/72XY-37PM].
227. See Stephanie Soong Johnston, Amazon Changes EU Structure to Book Profits in Local
Countries, 78 TAX NOTES INT’L 797 (2015); Lisa Fleisher & Sam Schechner, Amazon Changes Tax
Practices in Europe Amid Investigations, WSJ (May 24, 2015, 7:15 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
amazon-changes-tax-practices-in-europe-amid-investigations-1432480170 [https://perma.cc/U78K-PR
Q9].
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amendment to the relevant bilateral treaties. Consider, for example, the “limita-
tion on benefits” (LoB) article the BEPS project adds to the OECD Model. LoB
provisions are intended to determine whether a taxpayer has a sufficient nexus
to a contracting state to be treated as eligible for the tax treaty benefits provided
for in a given bilateral tax treaty.228 LoB provisions make that determination
through a series of clearly delineated and often quite complicated objective
tests.229 LoB articles are one alternative for addressing tax treaty abuse under a
“minimum standard” approach to treaty abuse that the BEPS project estab-
lishes.230 The OECD will accordingly incorporate the LoB rule as part of a new,
independent article in the OECD Model Treaty. Given that adding an LoB to an
existing tax treaty generally requires adding an entirely new treaty article that
creates previously non-existent bright-line limitations on eligibility for treaty
benefits, courts are unlikely to impute LoB rules into existing tax treaties in any
jurisdiction, absent explicit amendment to the tax treaty in question. Ambula-
tory interpretation has its limits.
Nevertheless, the new minimum standard in the treaty abuse area is likely to
be rapidly implemented by most jurisdictions. Treaty negotiators who might
otherwise have reserved on the LoB, the alternative “principal purpose test” for
addressing treaty abuse, or both, generally felt constrained from doing so by the
political pressure they face to agree on outputs as part of the BEPS project. At
the same time, it is unlikely that the preexisting norm—that countries start
negotiating from the OECD Model Treaty unless one of the countries has made
an observation or reservation on that provision—will cease to apply in the
post-BEPS environment. Instead, it seems likely that treaty negotiators will feel
pressured to meet the new minimum standard on treaty abuse in one way or
another. Among other reasons, their counterparts in tax treaty negotiations will
expect it.
Moreover, the alternative approach to meeting the minimum standard to
combat treaty abuse that the OECD has agreed upon, the principal purpose test
(PPT) proposal, is subject to ambulatory interpretation. The PPT alternative
adds a rule to tax treaties providing that tax treaty benefits will be denied to a
taxpayer on an item of income or capital if it is reasonable to conclude that
obtaining that benefit was one of the principal purposes of any arrangement or
transaction that resulted directly or indirectly in that benefit, unless it is estab-
lished that granting that benefit in the relevant circumstances would be in
228. John Bates et al., Limitations on Benefits Articles in Income Tax Treaties: The Current State of
Play, 41 INTERTAX 395, 395 (2013).
229. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, UNITED STATES MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION OF
NOVEMBER 15, 2006 art. 22 (2006), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/hp1
6801.pdf [https://perma.cc/7R72-YVPS]; U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, UNITED STATES MODEL TECHNICAL
EXPLANATION ACCOMPANYING THE UNITED STATES MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION OF NOVEMBER 15, 2006,
63–73 (2006), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/hp16802.pdf [https://
perma.cc/4AWQ-ARSN]; BEPS ACTION 6, supra note 214.
230. See BEPS ACTION 6, supra note 214.
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accordance with the object and purpose of the relevant provisions of the tax
treaty.231 The PPT is described in the new Commentary as consistent with
longstanding principles of tax treaty interpretation.232 Given the ambulatory
approach to treaty interpretation, courts in various jurisdictions are likely to
import the PPT into existing tax treaties (unless their tax administration alterna-
tively adopts LoB rules for the country’s treaties).233 Thus, the area of tax treaty
abuse provides another example of how the constraints felt by tax treaty
negotiators in combination with the ambulatory theory of tax treaty interpreta-
tion make the OECD Model particularly effective as a form of soft law.
C. WHAT ABOUT TREATY OVERRIDES?
In the majority of countries around the world, tax treaties are legally superior
to domestic law.234 One consequence of the legal priority given to treaties is that
the tools used to interpret those treaties implicitly receive that same priority.
This legal fact is another key reason that the OECD Model is so efficacious in
many countries around the world—Model Treaty-based interpretive principles
used by courts to interpret bilateral tax treaties can implicitly trump domestic
law, even though the OECD Model is a non-binding instrument.
However, in many common law countries—a minority of jurisdictions glob-
ally—domestic legislation is generally required to implement treaty obliga-
tions.235 In these countries, as well as other countries where treaties and statutes
have no priority vis-a`-vis one another, treaties are subject to repeal by later-in-
time legislation.236 Nevertheless, as a historical matter, in the tax area the
overwhelming majority of countries in which treaty overrides are theoretically
possible have remained highly averse to enacting tax treaty overrides through
231. See id. at 43–44.
232. Id. at 93.
233. The potential for PPT importation is particularly high in the many countries whose tax
legislation includes general antiabuse rules that are subject to judicial interpretation. For two surveys of
general antiabuse rules in various states, see EY, GAAR RISING: MAPPING TAX ENFORCEMENT’S EVOLU-
TION (2013), http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Mapping_tax_enforcement%E2%80%99s_
evolution/$FILE/GAAR.pdf [https://perma.cc/HZ8P-YTCW]; PWC, REMOVING THE FENCES: LOOKING
THROUGH GAAR (2012), https://www.pwc.in/assets/pdfs/publications-2012/pwc-white-paper-on-gaar.
pdf [https://perma.cc/HKJ9-GE7K]. Both surveys highlight that in various jurisdictions general antiabuse
rules are being applied to treaty issues even though there is no explicit authorization for doing so.
234. See Reuvan S. Avi-Yonah, Tax Treaty Overrides: A Qualified Defense of U.S. Practice, in TAX
TREATIES AND DOMESTIC LAW 65 (Guglielmo Maisto ed., 2006). Space does not permit me to fully
describe the various ways that domestic legal systems address the relationship of treaty law to domestic
statutes or to engage with the long-standing monist/dualist debate regarding whether treaties should
have the formal status of law in a domestic legal order without further action by a legislature that
formally incorporates that treaty into the relevant domestic law. However, speaking roughly, the
majority of states take a more monist perspective—meaning that treaties that have entered into force do
not necessarily require separate implementing legislation to become part of domestic law and usually
override any inconsistent domestic legislation. ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRAC-
TICE 181–95 (2d ed. 2007).
235. Avi-Yonah, supra note 234.
236. For example, in the United States, treaties and statutes are both the law of the land, but treaties
may be overridden by later-in-time statutes. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 191, at 314–15.
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later-in-time domestic statutes. In the late 1980s, when the United States
enacted two tax treaty overrides, the OECD issued a report that quite scathingly
condemned such behavior, and that report received equal levels of support from
common law and civil law countries alike.237
However, domestic law measures that could be characterized as tax treaty
overrides were recently proposed in Australia and enacted in the UK in reaction
to the BEPS project.238 Officials from both governments describe these legisla-
tive actions as a response to the heightened political salience of international tax
affairs. In its 2015–2016 budget, the Australian government announced that it
would introduce a provision that would allow the Commissioner of Taxation to
cancel the Australian tax benefits obtained in connection with an identified
“scheme” to “artificially” avoid having a permanent establishment as defined in
Australia’s current tax treaties.239 The UK’s diverted profits tax (DPT) came
into effect on April 1, 2015, and targets taxation instances where, under existing
permanent establishment rules, an MNC legitimately avoids a UK taxable
presence, but the MNC continues to have activities in the UK in connection
with the supply of goods or services to UK customers.240
Even these exceptional cases, however, suggest that the OECD Model Treaty
remains efficacious. For instance, although the legislation proposed in Australia
would override Australia’s tax treaties and in effect create a new PE threshold in
Australia for certain large foreign MNCs, the rules proposed in that legislation
are commensurate with the two major revisions to the OECD Model’s PE
threshold agreed to in the BEPS project.241 In other words, the Australian
237. See OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs Report on Tax Treaty Overrides, 2 TAX NOTES INT’L 25
(1990).
238. Robert Stack, the senior United States international tax official at the Department of the
Treasury, made a similar observation in a heavily reported speech:
[B]oth the UK and Australian approach use as a starting point in the application of their
PE-related diverted profits approach, that goods or services are provided in their jurisdiction,
and there is some activity in the jurisdiction related to the sales of those goods or services . . . .
[W]e all learned in our introductory international tax law classes that this is the very issue that
is addressed directly and explicitly by the PE rules in a treaty . . . .
Stack, U.S. Treasury Official Discusses The Progress and Future of the OECD BEPS Project, supra
note 85.
239. See Exposure Draft, Tax Laws Amendment (Tax Integrity Multinational Anti-Avoidance Law)
Bill 2015 (Austl.), http://www.treasury.gov.au/!/media/Treasury/Consultations%20and%20Reviews/
Consultations/2015/Tax%20Integrity%20Law/Key%20Documents/PDF/ED_Tax_Integrity_M
ultinational_Anti-avoidance_Law.ashx [https://perma.cc/4B9H-MVG4]; Explanatory Memorandum, Tax
Laws Amendment (Tax Integrity Multinational Anti-Avoidance Law) Bill 2015, ¶ 1.15 (Austl.), http://
www.treasury.gov.au/!/media/Treasury/Consultations%20and%20Reviews/Consultations/2015/Tax
%20Integrity%20Law/Key%20Documents/PDF/EM_Tax_Integrity_Multinational_Anti-avoidance_Law.
ashx [https://perma.cc/6D9Y-E2XZ].
240. Finance Act 2015, c. 4, §§ 77–116 (U.K.); see also SKADDEN, DIVERTED PROFITS TAX CLIENT
BRIEFING (2014), http://www.skadden.com/newsletters/Diverted_Profits_Tax%20_Client_Briefing.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9UJB-4LT7].
241. Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 239. Indeed, when asked at a major OECD tax
conference what more the Australian proposal would reach if one assumed all BEPS PE proposals were
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proposal is best characterized as an attempt to enact the BEPS project’s PE
outputs without bothering to negotiate with other states about the substance of
Australia’s actual bilateral tax treaties. While such an action would be a treaty
override, it does not weaken (indeed, perhaps strengthens) the case that changes
to the OECD Model are self-enforcing.
The UK DPT represents a harder case. The DPT is not consistent with the
OECD’s work on the PE threshold in the BEPS project. Moreover, under UK
domestic law, taxpayers only have standing to challenge a UK tax as inconsis-
tent with the UK’s tax treaties to the extent provided by statute, and the existing
UK statute may not extend to the DPT, so recourse to tax treaties and therefore
Model Treaty-based interpretive principles may not be available.242 Neverthe-
less, closer inspection of the DPT leaves some room for doubt as to how often it
will in fact be imposed. Unlike every other UK tax, Her Majesty’s Revenue and
Customs (HMRC) effectively electively assess the DPT, so some practitioners
have suggested that the DPT is a purely prophylactic measure.243 Moreover, it
seems likely that HMRC would hesitate to a greater degree in assessing the
DPT in circumstances when the taxpayer is within the bounds of revised OECD
Model Treaty PE principles than it would otherwise.244 Thus, even analysis of
the DPT—the exception that proves the rule—supports the idea that bifurcating
analysis between Model Treaty-based and non-Model Treaty-based measures
remains appropriate.
D. THE MULTILATERAL INSTRUMENT AND THE BOUNDARIES OF THE MODEL TREATY
The outcome of the work on a multilateral instrument as part of the BEPS
Action Plan illustrates both that the boundary between Model Treaty-based and
non-Model Treaty-based parts of the international tax architecture is durable
and that marrying the political efficacy of G-20-convened soft-law processes
enacted into Australia’s tax treaties, Australia’s leading international tax official responded that in such
a circumstance there would be no further items to address. Notes of Author in response to question
posed by author at OECD-USCIB conference June 11–12, 2015.
242. CHRIS DAVIES ET AL., CLIFFORD CHANCE, THE UK DIVERTED PROFITS TAX: FINAL LEGISLATION
PUBLISHED 9–10 (Mar. 15, 2015), http://www.cliffordchance.com/briefings/2015/03/the_uk_diverted_
profitstaxfinallegislatio.html [https://perma.cc/LF5V-T999] (explaining that the relevant provision of
the Taxation (International and Other Provisions) Act (2010), section 6, does not refer to the DPT and
likely will not be amended to provide recourse for domestic taxpayers).
243. EY, UK RELEASES DETAILS REGARDING DIVERTED PROFITS TAX (2014), http://www.ey.com/P
ublication/vwLUAssets/UK_releases_details_regarding_Diverted_Profits_Tax/$FILE/2014G_CM4998_
UK%20releases%20details%20re%20DPT.pdf [https://perma.cc/JWS4-AVDF].
244. Indeed, other sovereigns may take measures to retaliate against the U.K. DPT to the extent the
UK tries to impose it beyond the boundaries of PE rules as agreed upon in the BEPS project. For
instance, the U.K. DPT (tellingly referred to by leading U.K. politicians as the “Google Tax”) is widely
suspected of being a discriminatory tax by U.S. practitioners and tax authorities. See Lee A. Sheppard
& Stephanie Soong Johnston, U.S. ‘Extremely Disappointed’ in DPT and BEPS Output, Stack Says, 78
TAX NOTES INT’L 1005, 1005 (2012). Section 891 of the Internal Revenue Code provides that income
taxes paid by U.K. corporations doing business in the United States would double if the President found
that a U.K. tax was being imposed extraterritorially or discriminatorily on U.S.-parented MNCs. I.R.C.
§ 891 (2015).
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with the legal efficacy of the OECD Model Treaty process may be highly
effective. As part of the BEPS Action Plan, a report entitled “Developing a
Multilateral Instrument to Modify Bilateral Tax Treaties” (Multilateral Instru-
ment Report) was delivered to the G-20 in September 2014.245 In early 2015, all
G-20 and OECD countries endorsed a mandate to negotiate this instrument.246
This multilateral instrument, if successfully completed, will substantially stream-
line the process of modifying certain treaty-based rules that are common to the
existing bilateral treaties of participating states. However, although the multilat-
eral instrument may amend a large percentage of the world’s existing bilateral
tax treaties to make them consistent with BEPS treaty-based recommendations,
it is structured to do so without abandoning the basic bilateral structure of tax
treaties, and without changing which parts of the international tax architecture
are within and outside the tax treaty architecture.247 Indeed, the Multilateral
Instrument Report emphasizes that doing anything more would be overbroad given
the overarching importance countries place on “tax sovereignty.”248
The OECD could never have studied the possibility of a multilateral instru-
ment of this sort, let alone obtained agreement to launch such a negotiation,
without the political will associated with G-20 convocation. Tax experts brought
together by the League of Nations, who in the 1920s and 1930s did the initial
work that underlies the OECD Model Treaty, originally conceived of a tax
treaty as a multilateral instrument.249 The 1963 OECD Model Treaty was
similarly intended as a model for multilateral negotiations within the OECD; as
late as 1977, OECD treaty documents still encouraged a multilateral approach
where feasible.250 Yet from then until the G-20 became involved, all groups of
officials who opined on actually launching a multilateral negotiation came out
against this approach.251 As the Multilateral Instrument Report emphasizes, it
245. MULTILATERAL INSTRUMENT, supra note 8. The author was an outside consultant to the OECD in
the development of this report and a member of the informal group of academic experts assembled to
examine the feasibility of modifying 3,000 different bilateral treaties through a single multilateral
instrument.
246. Id. at 10.
247. Id. at 20–21.
248. Id. at 16. The report emphasized that:
In tax matters, the concept of sovereignty underpins the stable tax framework within which
governments have been able to facilitate arrangements that allowed for the benefits of
globalisation to flow to all market economies. . . . Recognising the tax sovereignty concern,
the report focuses on implementing treaty measures, even though a multilateral instrument
could in principle also be used to express commitments to implement certain domestic law
measures.
Id. at 16.
249. Report Presented by the Fiscal Comm. on the Work of the Third Session of the Comm., League
of Nations Doc. C.415.M.171 1931 II (1931) (Appendix I–III).
250. See Vogel, supra note 195, at 11; Jeffrey Owens & Mary Bennett, OECD Model Tax Conven-
tion, OECD OBSERVER (Oct. 2008), http://www.oecdobserver.org/news/archivestory.php/aid/2756/
OECD_Model_Tax_Convention.html [https://perma.cc/6B36-RCED].
251. See Richard J. Vann, A Model Tax Treaty for the Asian-Pacific Region?, 45 BULL. FOR INT’L
FISCAL DOCUMENTATION 151, 151 (1991).
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required “strong impetus at the highest political level” to achieve “political
acceptance from a critical mass of jurisdictions” for a multilateral negotia-
tion.252 When the G-20 became involved, after almost a hundred years of
resistance, a negotiation to create a hard-law, multilateral tax treaty instrument
began in earnest. It is instructive that even this historic multilateral tax treaty
negotiating process is premised on preserving the border between Model Treaty-
based measures and other parts of international tax policy.
CONCLUSION
International tax law has entered a new era of multilateralism. The financial
crisis destabilized a long-established system of international tax governance by
focusing unprecedented political attention on international taxation. Over the
last few years, the G-20 has acted as the primary agenda-setter for international
tax diplomacy for the first time. G-20 convocation, standard-setting, and monitor-
ing, as well as a general reliance on informal political declarations, have
become an established part of the international tax landscape. As a result, both
what can and cannot be achieved multilaterally in international tax affairs have
changed. Moreover, given the heightened political profile of international tax
affairs and the tendency for the G-20 to continue pursuing an issue once it
begins to do so, there is no reason to believe that this phenomenon is temporary.
Rather, we likely have a “new normal.”
The soft law developed through G-20-convened processes differs in kind
from the soft law that is familiar to practitioners from the OECD Model. Instead, this
form of soft law is quite similar procedurally to international financial law. Past
evidence suggests that successful implementation of international financial law-style
economic governance requires multiple elements: agreement as to standards, monitor-
ing that effectively determines whether standards are being met, enforcement mecha-
nisms that ensure initial implementation by a sufficiently broad range of states, and
continuing pressures that ensure ongoing compliance. Often, one or more of these
elements is missing or fades over time.
On the other hand, the deference that courts, tax administrations, and treaty
negotiators give to the OECD Model Treaty and Commentary provides a
built-in enforcement mechanism that is more effective than the enforcement
mechanisms known in international financial law. As a result, the patterns seen
in international financial law implementation are not likely to be replicated in
the parts of international tax governance that play off the tax treaty architecture.
The fact that a multilateral instrument to implement OECD Model Treaty-based
BEPS measures is to be negotiated only strengthens this conclusion. In the
OECD Model Treaty-based space, implementation into hard law of changes
agreed to in the course of the BEPS project is likely to be rather swift. Marrying
the political efficacy of G-20-convened soft-law processes with the legal effi-
cacy of changes to the OECD Model is powerful. The deep shadow of potential
252. MULTILATERAL INSTRUMENT, supra note 8, at 17.
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noncompliance that sits over agenda items in international financial law, or
other parts of the BEPS Action Plan, does not affect OECD Model Treaty-based
measures to nearly the same extent.
The boundary between OECD Model Treaty-based and other parts of the
international tax architecture is durable. Accordingly, analysis and forecasting
of the future of the international tax regime should be bifurcated between those
issue areas that are or can easily be incorporated into bilateral tax treaties and those
that cannot. Outside the OECD Model Treaty-based space, as long as international tax
matters remain highly politically salient, international tax agreements are most likely
to be effective if preferences are aligned and distributive problems are largely absent
among the major economies. Information-sharing agreements, which come with a
strong logic of appropriateness associated with transparency and can be described as
producing nonrival benefits, are thus one category of agreement that is likely to be
implemented. Agreements in principle may be reached in other areas, where incen-
tives are not aligned among major state actors. However, implementing those agree-
ments will require the exercise of coercion by a sufficiently powerful subset of leading
economies or market pressures that allow a subset of states to impose a standard
without affirmatively coercing other states—in combination with administrable moni-
toring mechanisms.
As a result, outside the OECD Model Treaty-based and transparency areas,
post-BEPS policymaking may, ironically, be characterized by policy fragmenta-
tion along national lines rather than a more consistent international regime.
Highly visible nonimplementation of OECD recommendations will help shape
the environment, while policy proposals that received substantial attention in
the context of BEPS may act as a locus for subsequent policy debates at the
domestic level. The importance of arguments about policy coherence developed
among tax regulators gathered at the OECD may decline while the logic of
consequences dominates decision making. When agreements in principle are
reached, but monitoring and enforcement mechanisms are not sufficiently bind-
ing, mock compliance by both states and private actors is likely to emerge.
Agreements reached in principle and national decisions regarding implementa-
tion will often not align. Importantly, however, OECD Model Treaty-based
agreements will be spared these pressures.
Therefore, analyzing the future of the international tax regime requires
breaking BEPS in two. This result should be relevant to anyone interested in
international economic law because the bifurcated regime that is developing for
international tax governance may be unique across the various fields of interna-
tional economic governance. This Article highlights how international finance
and international tax are becoming procedurally similar tasks of international
economic diplomacy and governance. At the same time, it differentiates interna-
tional tax from other areas of international economic regulation because of the
OECD Model. In doing so, the Article provides a high-profile example of how
the character of underlying legal institutions can alter the implementation
prospects of international regulatory agreements.
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